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MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW: THE 
COMMON LAW CASE FOR REASONABLE NOTICE OF 
TERMINATION 
Rachel Arnow-Richman* 
This Article simultaneously exposes a fundamental error in 
employment termination doctrine and a paradox in contract law 
jurisprudence. Contemporary employment law has developed under the 
assumption that at-will parties may terminate their relationship both 
without reason and without notice. This Article argues that the second 
half of this formulation—the idea that parties reserve the procedural 
right to terminate without notice—is neither historically supported nor 
legally correct. Employment at will, as originally expressed, was a mere 
duration presumption reflecting America’s rejection of the predominant 
British rule favoring one-year employment terms. While subsequent 
case law expanded the presumption in various ways, a reinterpretation 
that requires advance notice of termination remains compatible with the 
way in which most contemporary courts articulate the rule. 
In fact, an examination of general contract law reveals that in a 
variety of nonemployment contexts, courts impose on parties to an 
indefinite relationship the duty to provide reasonable notice while still 
safeguarding their right to terminate at will. Such an obligation serves 
not only as a gap filler in the face of contractual silence, but also as a 
good faith limitation on parties’ exercise of substantive discretion. 
Absent such a notice requirement, employment is an illusory 
relationship, one that lacks the modicum of consideration necessary to 
create a binding contract. While courts have sought to circumvent this 
problem by theorizing employment as a unilateral contract, that 
formulation is ill-suited to the reality that both sides generally anticipate 
an ongoing, dynamic relationship.  
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This Article recasts employment as a bilateral contract terminable at 
will by either party upon reasonable notice. Establishing a reasonable 
notice obligation will grant terminated workers paid transition time to 
seek new employment and develop new skills. At the same time, 
adopting this rule paves the way for a more unified body of contract 
law. The case for deviations from general contract principles is 
strongest where context-specific rules fulfill the reasonable expectations 
of the weaker party. Employment-specific contract rules, as they 
currently stand, do precisely the opposite. While ordinary contract law 
cannot adequately protect workers’ interests in all circumstances, this 
Article demonstrates that in at least some instances mainstream 
doctrine, properly understood and applied, can produce results that are 
both good for workers and in harmony with existing law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Employment contract law is an outlier. And not in the way one 
might expect. Because workers are generally in positions of 
dependence, one would anticipate that the law of employment contracts 
would eschew strict application of contract principles in favor of giving 
force to workers’ reasonable expectations. Certainly, some of the highly 
publicized decisions of 1980s employment contract jurisprudence, 
viewed in isolation, can be characterized as manipulating the formalities 
of contract formation in favor of finding liability on the part of the 
employer.1 However, an overall examination of employment contract 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985) 
(assigning contractual significance to employer personnel manual); Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 
171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that a contractually enforceable 
promise of long-term security may be derived from the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
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law reveals a very different landscape. Generally, judicial assumptions 
about how contract principles apply to employment relationships are at 
odds with contemporary, realist-inspired contract doctrine.2 The upshot 
is that contemporary courts counterintuitively apply contract rules in 
ways that leave workers worse off than commercial entities that deal 
with financial equals. 
This Article focuses on one example of this counterintuitive 
distinction between the law of contracts and the law of employment 
contracts—the absence of an affirmative obligation to provide notice of 
termination under employment law. Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) and common law contracts cases outside of the 
employment context, parties to an at-will relationship must provide 
advance notice prior to exercising their right to terminate.3 In contrast, 
employment relationships of indefinite duration are generally assumed 
to be both terminable without reason and terminable without notice. 
This Article aims to change that. It argues that the dominant 
assumption that employment at will permits employers to terminate 
workers without notice is neither historically accurate nor doctrinally 
justified.4 Employment at will, as originally adopted, was a mere 
                                                                                                                     
the parties’ relationship). See generally Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will 
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 345 
(1986) (observing that “some courts have found [enforceable employment] agreements under 
circumstances that would probably garner a first-year Contracts student an F for saying that a 
contract was formed at all”). 
 2. Particularly in recent years, there has been a move toward more formalistic 
approaches to contract enforcement, most notably with respect to judicial deference to 
employer-drafted disclaimer language. Contemporary courts are generally willing to credit 
boilerplate language reciting that employment is at will and disclaiming contractual liability for 
arbitrary termination, even in the face of competing evidence of contractual commitment. See, 
e.g., Grossman v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305–06 (D. Conn. 2000); 
Finch v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co. of Sheridan, 109 P.3d 537, 541–42 (Wyo. 2005); Guz v. 
Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1094–95 (Cal. 2000); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 
N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. 1991). See generally Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Employment as 
Transaction, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 469 (2009) (describing courts’ willingness to 
rubberstamp employer-drafted disclaimers in personnel manuals); Jonathan Fineman, The 
Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 
351–52 (2008) (discussing the limitations of the implied contract theory in light of employers’ 
ability to insist on their preferred express terms).  
 3. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2012) (“Termination of a contract by one party except on the 
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other 
party . . . .”); infra Section III.A. 
 4. The doctrinal theories proposed in this Article would necessarily give rise to a 
reciprocal obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination—both terminating employers 
and departing employees would be required to provide advance notice. However, the amount of 
notice required would vary depending on the factual circumstances. See infra Section V.A. It is 
therefore likely that the notice obligations of employees who voluntarily quit would be minimal 
compared to those of terminating employers. This Article also assumes that a common law right 
to advance notice of termination will be more valuable to and more frequently invoked by 
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duration presumption supplied in the absence of an express term 
regarding the length of the engagement.5 Nothing in the original 
articulation of the rule or its subsequent adoption or expansion by courts 
compels the conclusion that employers may terminate without advance 
warning. In fact, general contract law, viewed outside the lens of 
employment at will, suggests precisely the opposite. Reasonable notice 
is at a minimum the doctrinally appropriate default term for the 
termination of indefinite contractual relationships. It is also an integral 
component of the duty of good faith and an implied term necessary for 
the recognition of an enforceable contract.6 Such theories suggest that 
reasonable notice is not just the proper default for at-will employment 
relationships, but rather a rule of indefinite contracts from which parties 
have only limited ability to deviate.7  
In this way, the argument presented in this Article is prescriptive but 
non-normative. There are numerous reasons why the law ought to 
require employers to provide advance notice of termination.8 Advance 
notice can be seen as a matter of fundamental fairness. Most workers 
rely on their employers as their sole source of income, and a sudden 
disruption in that flow of income takes an enormous personal and 
financial toll. Providing advance notice of termination gives the worker 
a paid window in which to seek alternate work and potentially avoid (or 
at least mitigate) the period of time she or he is without income.9 A 
notice requirement may also be socially beneficial. Employees who 
                                                                                                                     
employees than employers. Employers are generally well equipped to withstand the loss of a 
single employee and are therefore unlikely to be able to show more than minimal damage in 
routine cases. They are also likely to be deterred from pursing claims by the practical 
impediments to recovering from an individual defendant. For these reason, this Article focuses 
principally on advance notice given by employers to involuntarily terminated employees, 
recognizing however that, in certain cases involving the defection of highly valuable employees, 
the theories advanced here would be available to the employer in pursing rights against former 
employees.  
 5. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 
(John D. Parsons, Jr. ed., 1877). 
 6. See infra Sections III.B–C. 
 7. The degree to which the parties may alter the proposed reasonable notice rule, I will 
contend, depends on the doctrinal foundation for its adoption. If reasonable notice is treated as a 
contract “gap filler,” it is vulnerable to employer efforts to contract back into a “no notice” 
regime. See infra Section III.A. However, there are additional contractual bases for implying a 
reasonable notice rule into at-will employment relationships under which parties’ abilities to 
avoid that obligation through drafting would be limited. See infra Sections III.B–C. 
 8. The arguments that follow are summarized from my prior work on this subject. See 
Rachel Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause to Just Notice in Reforming Employment 
Termination Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAW passim (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) [hereinafter Arnow-
Richman, From Just Cause]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment 
At Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1 passim (2010) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just Notice]. 
 9. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 37. 
5
Arnow-Richman: Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1518 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
receive notice are less likely to require unemployment insurance or 
other government benefits.10 Finally, notice may effectuate parties’ 
implicit understanding of the terms of their relationship. While the days 
of lifetime employment with a single company have past, employers 
still make implicit promises to their workers, including the promise that 
they will receive skills and training that will keep them marketable.11 A 
notice rule translates that promise into a legal obligation, requiring 
employers to underwrite the costs of its workers’ transition, positioning 
them to better take advantage of their skills in the inevitable situation of 
job loss.12  
Arguments such as these have given rise to existing legislative 
inroads into employment at will, such as plant closing laws that require 
advance notice in the case of mass terminations.13 They have also been 
invoked in calls to replace employment at will with a “just cause” rule,14 
and could support a general statute requiring notice.15 I have explored 
these arguments, and their limitations,16 at length elsewhere. My aim 
here is narrower and more pragmatic. My argument is not that a notice 
requirement is normatively grounded, but rather that it can be 
doctrinally supported, and indeed, may be doctrinally compelled. In this 
way, this Article lays a foundation for litigation seeking judicial 
recognition of a right to reasonable notice of at-will termination.  
At a more abstract level, however, this Article makes a claim about 
the viability of contract-based solutions to issues of worker protection 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 321. 
 11. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 32–33. 
 12. See id. at 39. 
 13. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–09 
(2006), requires large employers to provide sixty days’ advance notice to workers who will be 
affected by a plant closing or mass layoff affecting a large portion of the workforce. See id. 
§§ 2101(a)(2)–(3), 2102. 
 14. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On 
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404–05 (1967) 
(emphasizing employee vulnerability in calling for just cause reform); Theodore J. St. Antoine, 
A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 
65–66 (1988) (offering the view that replacing employment at will with a just cause rule “is a 
matter of simple justice” and that there is “little or nothing to be said in favor of an employer’s 
right to treat its employees arbitrarily or unfairly”); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in 
the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 77–78 (2000) 
(arguing that the employment at-will rule results in the subordination of workers). 
 15. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 35–37.  
 16. For instance, an important countervailing policy consideration in contemplating 
adoption of a notice of termination rule is the extent to which it will impose additional costs on 
employers that may ultimately translate into fewer jobs, lower wages, or both. I explore these 
possibilities in From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 319–22, concluding that the costs of a notice 
requirement will be less than the amount of wages paid by employers during the notice period 
and that employers are unlikely to be able to fully pass such costs on to workers in the form of 
lower wages. 
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and the relationship between contract and employment law generally. It 
has been observed that employment is anticontractual both in its 
application of employment at will and its treatment of other contract 
rules.17 Yet to date, no scholar has delineated a competing vision of 
employment at will that better aligns with contract doctrine while 
enhancing common law protection for workers. This Article fills that 
gap. It argues that employment contracts should be “mainstreamed,” 
that is, analyzed consistent with contract principles of general 
applicability. Basic contract interpretation principles offer a doctrinal 
foundation for requiring employers to provide notice of termination, 
much as the law does for other contracting parties.18 In so doing, this 
Article claims neither that contract law should be exceptionally 
generous toward workers nor that contract law can adequately protect 
workers’ interests in all cases. Rather it argues that contract doctrine, 
properly understood and applied, can produce better results for workers, 
while bringing the law of employment more in line with the law of 
contracts. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I revisits the history of 
employment at will, focusing on issues of notice rather than cause. It 
argues that whatever the origin or the accuracy of the American rule 
permitting employers to terminate without reason, the at-will rule never 
clearly embraced the idea that employment may be terminated without 
notice. Part II surveys the contemporary law regarding notice of at-will 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125 (1976) [hereinafter Feinman, Employment At Will] (describing the 
employment at will rule as a “departure” from “pure [contract] doctrine” and noting that “[i]f 
the law on duration of service contracts had followed the teachings of pure contract theory, the 
agreement established by the parties would have been enforced [and all evidence of party intent 
would have been considered]. . . . But the contract approach was never implemented because of 
the rise of employment at will”); W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does 
Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 12 (2003) (arguing 
that courts’ treatment of the enforceability of employer modifications of binding personnel 
manuals reflects a “misunderstanding [of] existing contract law” that defeats employees’ 
reasonable expectations, and creates bad public policy without enhancing employers’ ability to 
alter their contracts); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of 
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1082, 1098–99 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, Contract of Employment] (describing the concept 
that “additional consideration” is required to overcome the presumption of employment at will 
as a “spurious contractual doctrine” and arguing that “[a]s any first semester law student 
knows . . . one performance can be consideration to support two or even twenty promises” and 
that “[t]he work performed could be consideration for both the wages paid and the promise of 
future employment”). 
 18. Since Section III.C presents, among the various legal foundations supporting a 
reasonable notice term, one that would treat notice as the requisite consideration for an 
enforceable indefinite contract, I will refer to reasonable notice in mandatory language—as a 
requirement, obligation, or duty—recognizing the possibility that a court might choose to adopt 
reasonable notice as a mere presumption or default term. See infra Section III.A.  
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termination. Contrary to what scholars assume, there is only minimal 
case law authority for the proposition that employers may terminate at-
will employees without notice, and there is precedent in a handful of 
jurisdictions to support the conclusion that parties to at-will 
employment contracts are in fact obligated to provide reasonable notice 
of termination. Part III lays the contact law foundation for reinterpreting 
employment at will to include a reasonable notice obligation. It argues 
that various principles of contract interpretation—the use of judicially 
or legislatively supplied “gap fillers,” the notion of a robust implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the willingness of courts to 
imply consideration to create enforceable obligations—support an 
understanding of employment at will that embraces an obligation to 
provide advance notice of termination. Part IV shows how employment 
law has inexplicably deviated from this basic understanding of contract 
law and demonstrates how employment contract law can be 
“mainstreamed” without sacrificing the substantive discretion afforded 
to employers under employment at will. Part V explores some of the 
limitations of the proposed reinterpretation of the common law, 
including the likelihood that employers will attempt to reimpose a “no 
notice” regime though standard form contracts. It suggests that this risk, 
coupled with other practical limitations of a reasonable notice rule, may 
be best resolved through clarifying legislation.  
I.  A REVISED HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
Scholars have long debated the origin and accuracy of the 
employment at-will rule.19 Most agree that courts’ wide-scale adoption 
of the doctrine in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries owes at 
least in part to treatise writer Horace Wood, who in 1877 famously 
penned the “inflexible” proposition that in the United States, “a general 
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will.”20 Several scholars 
have called into question the accuracy of Wood’s statement as a 
reflection of then-prevailing law.21 This critique, however, has done 
little to advance broader claims about the desirability of changing the at-
will rule. Since almost every jurisdiction has judicially embraced 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See generally Daniel P. O’Gorman, The Statute of Frauds and Oral Promises of Job 
Security: The Tenuous Distinction Between Performance and Excusable Nonperformance, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1023, 1044–45 (2010) (summarizing the literature). 
 20. See WOOD, supra note 5, § 134, at 272. 
 21. See, e.g., Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 126–27; Jay M. Feinman, 
The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 735–37 
(1991) [hereinafter Feinman, Revisited]; Summers, Contract of Employment, supra note 17, at 
1083; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 
STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); see also Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will 
in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 970 
(1985) (“Commentators now agree that Wood invented his own rule.”). 
8
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Wood’s statement of the law, it is now firmly ensconced, and inquiries 
into the origin of the rule provide little insight.22 In addition, the 
historical critique of Wood’s rule comprised part of a larger movement 
in legal scholarship supporting the adoption of a “just cause” rule in 
place of the prevailing rule permitting employers to terminate for any or 
no reason.23 Unsurprisingly, this movement gained little traction outside 
academic circles because it targeted the part of the at-will doctrine that 
courts most clearly embraced and employers most revered.24  
What has escaped wide notice is that there is a far more vulnerable 
component of the employment at-will rule, one that has even less 
historical foundation and judicial support—the idea that employers may 
terminate without notice. A reexamination of Wood’s rule and the 
precedents at the time reveal minimal support for the idea that the right 
to terminate at will (that is, at any time for any reason) was coextensive 
with a right to terminate without prior notice. Thus, the employment at-
will rule is, as some scholars suggest, vulnerable from a historical and 
doctrinal perspective, albeit in a different way and for a different reason.  
This Part places Wood’s articulation of the employment at-will rule 
in the context of the historical law regarding notice of termination. It 
demonstrates that Wood’s rule and the precedents he cited primarily 
served to reject the English “one-year presumption.” Wood did not 
articulate a “no notice” rule, nor did the then-prevailing law clearly 
embrace such a principal. Thus, the rule on notice of termination—a 
question distinct from that of contract duration—remained unresolved 
                                                                                                                     
 22. By the early twentieth century, most states in the union had explicitly adopted 
employment at will. See Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A 
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 708 (2006); Andrew P. Morriss, 
Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 
59 MO. L. REV. 679, 717–20 (1994). See Montana later adopted a statutory just cause rule 
superseding the common law at-will doctrine. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -15 (West 2013). Most scholars agree about the current state 
of the law, irrespective of their views on its origin. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread 
of At-Will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 
75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 460 (2008); Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the 
Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 
461–62 (1979). See generally Summers, supra note 14, at 67–68 (conceding that employment at 
will is “embedded in American law”). 
 23. For examples of scholarship in this vein, see generally, Blades, supra note 14, at 
1404–05, 1410; Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change 
in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (1979); St. Antoine, supra note 14, at 65–66; Summers, supra 
note 14, at 77–78.  
 24. It also encountered serious backlash within some academic circles, notably by those 
legal scholars working in the law and economics tradition. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In 
Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 948–51 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, 
Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1901, 1901–02 (1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term 
Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 841–42. 
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subsequent to Wood’s treatise and judicial adoption of his rule.  
A.  Notice to Terminate in Wood’s Rule 
Critiques of Wood’s rule generally take issue with the authority he 
cites in his treatise and the degree to which it supports the existence of 
an at-will rule.25 Whether Wood was “right” about these precedents 
depends largely on what one thinks he was trying to prove. Although it 
is generally thought of and treated as a single rule, employment at will 
is a multipart doctrine from which three distinct principles can be 
derived: (1) a presumption that employment is of indefinite duration, 
what this Article refers to as the “indefinite duration” rule; (2) a 
presumption that employers may terminate for any or no reason, what 
this section refers to as the “substantive discretion” rule; and (3) a 
presumption that employers may terminate without notice or warning, 
what this Article refers to as the “procedural discretion” rule.26  
Historically the notion of employment at will existed only in the first 
sense of the term, that is, it supplied a mechanism for determining the 
duration of a contract in the absence of an express term.27 In the early 
nineteenth century, the law of England followed the “one-year 
presumption” under which employment of indefinite duration was 
presumed to endure for one year.28 The reason for the presumption is 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 126; Feinman, Revisited, supra 
note 21, at 737–39; Summers, Contract of Employment, supra note 17, at 1083; Shapiro & 
Tune, supra note 21, at 341. But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful 
Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990) (countering that 
“Wood relied on four American cases for his black letter rule, and notwithstanding the persistent 
assertions to the contrary, these cases do indeed support the principle for which Wood cited 
them”). 
 26.  Although courts often describe employment at will as a “presumption,” I refer to the 
doctrine and its three components as “rules,” as do other scholars, recognizing that in light of 
how courts have interpreted and applied the doctrine, it is extraordinarily difficult for employees 
to demonstrate that employment is other than at will. See, e.g., Matthew Finkin, et al., Working 
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: 
Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 110 (2009) (“[Employment] at-will is either a 
rebuttable presumption that is almost irrebuttable or a default rule that tends toward an 
immutable rule”); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment 
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 677 (1996) (noting that “the presumption of at-will 
employment was applied [by early twentieth century courts] with such vigor that it was virtually 
impossible to overcome”); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of 
Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1082, 1097 (1984) (asserting that “courts transformed Wood’s presumption into a virtual rule of 
law . . . made nearly irrebuttable by [their requirement] that the parties expressly agree to a 
definite term”).  
 27. WOOD, supra note 5, § 134, at 272 
 28. Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 119–20; Sanford M. Jacoby, The 
Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical 
Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 95 (1982). 
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often attributed to a desire to support the mutual interests of employers 
and employees in an agrarian economy. By holding both sides to a one-
year contract, the worker was ensured a continuous stream of income 
during the idle winter months, while the employer could rely on a 
supply of available labor during peak planting and harvesting seasons.29 
Although the presumption was never limited to agricultural workers, 
the advent of an industrialized economy put pressure on the doctrine 
both in the United Kingdom, where it originated, and in the United 
States, where courts frequently relied on British law, such that in time 
courts abandoned it.30 In the United Kingdom, courts moved toward the 
use of notice periods, under which parties could terminate at any time 
with sufficient advance warning.31 The same practice developed in 
Canada, which also took its cues from British law.32 By contrast, in the 
United States courts moved toward the presumption that employment 
was terminable at will, that is, terminable at any time absent proof of a 
defined period of engagement.33 The American trend toward at-will 
employment neither took a position on the use of notice periods nor 
precluded a reading that would require notice. 
The precedents relied on by Wood reflect the move away from the 
one-year presumption toward an indefinite duration rule, and to that 
extent his defenders are correct that his cases support his assertion.34 
However, Wood’s rule and the precedents he cites are either silent or 
ambiguous on the other aspects of employment at will. They provide no 
clear support for the idea that employment can be terminated without 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 120 (“The [one-year 
presumption] expressed a sound principle: injustice would result if . . . [the employer] could 
avoid supporting [employees] during the unproductive winter, or if [employees] . . . could leave 
their [employer] when their labor was most needed.”); Jacoby, supra note 28, at 90 (citing 
Blackstone’s attribution of the presumption to “a principle of natural equity, that the servant 
shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective 
seasons, as well when there is work to be done as when there is not”); Brian Etherington, The 
Enforcement of Harsh Termination Provisions in Personal Employment Contracts: The Rebirth 
of Freedom of Contract in Ontario, 35 MCGILL L.J. 459, 471 (1990) (“The [one-year] 
presumption meant that a master who had employed a servant through the growing or 
production season had to maintain him for the rest of the year . . . .”). This is not to suggest that 
benevolence was the principal motivation for the presumption. Concerns about the cost of 
poverty relief and the economic threat of labor disruptions were arguably more significant 
factors. See id.; Jacoby, supra note 28, at 90. 
 30.  Jacoby, supra note 28, at 97–98, 101, 106. 
 31. See id. at 100–01. 
 32. See Etherington, supra note 29, at 471. 
 33. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 125–26. Over time, courts also 
made it increasingly difficult for litigants to overcome that presumption by limiting the type of 
evidence that could be presented to support the existence of a different contractual 
understanding. See Feinman, Revisited, supra note 21, at 736–39. 
 34. Freed & Polsby, supra note 25, at 554. 
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reason, the substantive discretion rule.35 In addition, and more 
importantly for present purposes, they fail to support a procedural 
discretion rule, one that sanctions termination at any time and without 
any notice. Indeed, to the extent Wood’s cases say anything about 
notice, they tend to support the view that notice of at-will termination 
must be provided.  
Wood’s cases are a motley bunch. Only two of the four—Tatterson 
v. Suffolk Manufacturing Co.36 and Franklin Mining v. Harris37—are 
truly employment cases. These are probably more fairly characterized 
as “jury question” cases rather than at-will cases—both affirm verdicts 
in favor of terminated employees who argued successfully that their 
employment was to endure for at least one year.38 To the extent the 
cases reject any presumption of a one-year term or a term corresponding 
to the employee’s pay period, they implicitly support the conclusion that 
a contract is presumed to be terminable at will unless the totality of facts 
demonstrates otherwise.  
Neither case, however, addresses the question whether notice of at-
will termination is required.39 In fact, in Tatterson, the court implicitly 
treated notice as a condition on the employer’s ability to terminate.40 In 
that case the employee was fired three months after his employer 
advised him that the business would be closing and that he should find 
other work.41 The defendants requested a jury instruction that the 
“plaintiff was not entitled to more than three months’ notice [and t]hat, 
if the jury were satisfied that the plaintiff was noti[f]ied . . . that the 
mills would stop in October and all the employees be 
discharged . . . then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.”42 The 
court found for the plaintiff–employee, presumably accepting his 
position that the contract was for a full year. Thus, while the case is at 
least consistent with an indefinite duration rule—the onus is on the 
employee to prove a one-year entitlement—it does not support any 
                                                                                                                     
 35. In some of the cases, the employer had a good reason to terminate, in others the 
reasons are opaque, but in no case does the employee allege or the facts suggest that the 
employer had a poor or arbitrary reason for its decision. 
 36. 106 Mass. 56 (1870). 
 37. 24 Mich. 115 (1871). 
 38. See id. at 116–17; Tatterson, 106 Mass. at 59. 
 39. In Tatterson, the court refused to consider a separate notice issue posed by the 
defendant—whether it had the right to prematurely terminate the employee, even if he was 
subject to a year-to-year agreement, upon the provision of proper notice—because this defense 
was not raised below. Tatterson, 106 Mass. at 59. 
 40. See id.  
 41. Id. at 57. 
 42. Id. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/2
2014] MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 1525 
 
other aspect of employment at will.43 If anything, the case suggests that 
an employer’s right to terminate, irrespective of the contract’s term, is 
subject to an obligation to provide advance notice.  
The other two cases do not lend themselves to easy characterization. 
One is tangentially about employment, while one is about military 
contracts; neither addresses the employer’s right to terminate without 
reason or without notice. In De Briar v. Minturn, the plaintiff received a 
monthly salary and a room at the employer’s inn.44 Upon dismissal, the 
innkeeper notified the plaintiff that he should vacate his room by the 
end of the month, which he refused to do.45 The parties did not question 
the innkeeper’s right to terminate, and to that extent, the case could be 
said to support employment at will.46 The issue before the court was 
whether the innkeeper could evict the plaintiff by force when he failed 
to vacate.47 As in Tatterson, the court did not address the question of 
prior notice, either with respect to termination of the employment or the 
tenancy. However, it is clear that the employer did provide advance 
notice, at least with respect to the latter.48 
The final case, United States. v. Wilder,49 could be said to cut in the 
other direction. The dispute involved an 1861 government contract for 
the periodic conveyance of supplies between a military storehouse and 
Fort Abercrombie in the Dakota Territory.50 Several years into the 
contract, upon being requested by the quartermaster to make an exigent 
delivery, the plaintiff insisted that the military increase its price due to 
increased “Indian hostilities.”51 The quartermaster orally agreed, but the 
government subsequently refused to pay more than the original price.52 
The court found for the plaintiff and awarded the balance owed.53  
Wood and his defenders take from Wilder that contracts can be 
terminated at will, and by the same token one could conclude from the 
case that such at-will terminations can occur without notice.54 Yet 
                                                                                                                     
 43. To the extent there was any discussion of the reason for termination, it was undisputed 
that the termination owed to the cessation of the defendant’s business. See id. at 57, 60. 
 44. 1 Cal. 450, 451 (1851). 
 45. Id.  
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. It is not clear from the facts whether advance notice of termination was provided. 
It is also unclear how much advance notice of the eviction was provided, though it was less than 
one month. 
 49. 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev’d, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 254 (1871). 
 50. Id. at 466–67.  
 51. Id. at 467.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 468. 
 54. I set aside the obvious question whether a case involving a military contract has any 
bearing, even by analogy, on the law of employment termination, an issue disputed by other 
scholars. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 25, at 555. One should note that besides the obvious 
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nothing in the court’s opinion, which contains no legal analysis, 
compels that conclusion.55 A better reading of Wilder is that the contract 
did not terminate at all, but rather was modified in light of a force 
majeure.56 Where extreme changes in outside circumstances not 
predictable to the parties fundamentally change the cost of performance, 
modern courts generally hold that a fair and equitable modification 
agreed to by the parties is enforceable notwithstanding the parties’ prior 
commitment.57 Under this view of the case, even if the original contract 
in Wilder was still in effect at the time of the price increase, it was not 
terminated at will by the plaintiff, but rather was equitably modified by 
both parties in light of the prevailing circumstances. 
The upshot is that, whatever one’s view of Wood’s rule and its 
provenance, Wood’s articulation of the American employment at-will 
doctrine did not embrace any particular rule regarding notice of 
termination, nor did the cases on which he relied. In one of Wood’s 
precedents, there is no mention of notice whatsoever.58 In two, the facts 
indicate that the terminating party provided advance notice to the 
plaintiff, although notice was not an issue in dispute.59 In the fourth 
case, and the one most factually distinguishable from the employment 
                                                                                                                     
substantive differences between the two contexts, the contract in Wilder was for multiple 
individual deliveries rather than a continuous performance like employment. See Wilder, 5 Ct. 
Cl. at 467. 
 55. The issue, as framed by the parties, was whether the original contract was still in 
effect when the new price was negotiated. See Wilder, 5 Ct. Cl. at 468. The defendant argued 
that the transporter had failed to provide “reasonable notice” of termination, while the plaintiff 
argued that the agreement terminated after one year pursuant to statutory law concerning 
military contracts. See id. at 463–65. The result in favor of the plaintiff could as easily have 
been based on the conclusion that the original contract had expired by statute as on the principle 
that indefinite contracts can be terminated at will. A third possibility is that the court concluded 
reasonable notice was given to the extent that the transporter notified the quartermaster of its 
new price requirements before agreeing to the new transport.  
 56. The “Indian hostilities” referred to in the opinion were a series of battles between the 
notorious Colonel Sibley and his army against a coalition of Native American tribes during and 
in the aftermath of the Dakota War of 1862. See Paul Finkelman, “I Could Not Afford to Hang 
Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 417 (2013). Fort Abercrombie, the military’s transport destination under 
the Wilder contract, was the stronghold supplying Sibley’s forces. 
 57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981) (“A promise modifying a 
duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding . . . if the modification is fair 
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was 
made . . . .”). In other words, such a modification does not run afoul of the preexisting legal duty 
rule that requires “new” consideration to support the modification of an executory contract. See 
id. § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the 
subject of honest dispute is not consideration . . . .”).  
 58. See Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871). 
 59. See Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56, 59 (1870); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 
Cal. 450, 451 (1851). 
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context, the losing party unsuccessfully argued that it was entitled to 
reasonable notice of contract termination.60 However, a fair reading of 
the case suggests that the contract had not terminated at all but rather 
had been voluntarily modified by the parties. In short, there is nothing 
in Wood’s rule or in the cases he cites that suggests that employers may 
terminate at-will employees without advance notice.  
B.  Notice to Terminate in Wood’s Time 
Following the publication of his treatise, Wood’s rule became the 
key source supporting the idea that an employment relationship has no 
fixed duration and, ultimately, that parties enjoy complete substantive 
discretion to terminate employment “at will.”61 However, no 
comparable rule evolved regarding notice. Rather, the law, both at the 
time of and subsequent to Wood’s rule, was unsettled.  
The slim body of reported case law from the turn of the twentieth 
century reveals at least three different approaches to notice of at-will 
termination. A handful of decisions hold or suggest that termination of 
an indefinite engagement could be effected without notice.62 For 
instance, in Coffin v. Landis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
permitted the immediate termination of an exclusive agency contract 
between a landowner and his hired sales agent.63 The defendant 
terminated the agreement several months after it was executed and 
before the plaintiff was able to earn any commissions.64 In the 
subsequent suit, the court explicitly rejected the plaintiff’s invitation to 
apply the one-year presumption of English law.65 It instead held that the 
agreement was terminable at the parties’ pleasure and that “no notice 
was necessary.”66 
Meanwhile, another group of cases from the same period hold the 
opposite. In Harper v. Hassard, decided less than ten years after Coffin, 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See Wilder, 5 Ct. Cl. at 465–66, 468.  
 61. See Summers, supra note 14, at 67–68. 
 62. See The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1907) (rejecting a claim by a marine 
engineer for wages for the remainder of the month, irrespective of whether he performed 
satisfactorily, concluding that “the contract constitutes . . . a hiring at will, which could be ended 
at any time, by either party, without notice”); Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 
(E.D. Mo. 1903) (rejecting a claim by workers terminated without notice and blacklisted for 
union activity, concluding that “in a free country like ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal 
right to quit the service of his employer without notice, and either with or without 
cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge his employ[ee], with or without notice, at 
any time”); Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864) (finding that an employer had the “right to 
discharge [his sales agent employee] from his service at any time” without notice). 
 63. 46 Pa. at 434. 
 64. Id. at 431. 
 65. Id. at 433–34. 
 66. Id.  
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opined that “reasonable 
notice” was required in the context of an at-will termination.67 There the 
defendants engaged the plaintiff to prepare and instruct them in the art 
of manufacturing color paints for a period not to exceed three years.68 
Within a few months, the defendants grew disappointed with the 
plaintiff’s skills and terminated him.69 The court held that because the 
written agreement did not commit the parties to a three-year term, it was 
an indefinite agreement and that consequently, “the defendants had the 
right to elect to terminate . . . at any time by reasonable notice.”70 
A third group of cases treat notice as a matter of custom. In 
Hathaway v. Bennett, a New York court rejected a claim brought by a 
newspaper carrier who was terminated without prior warning.71 The 
court held that the carrier did not demonstrate a practice in the 
newspaper industry of providing a month’s notice.72 Similarly, in Gray 
v. Wulff, an Illinois court rejected a claim by a terminated orchestra 
leader upon finding that his employer had provided one week’s notice.73 
Absent a fixed term, the court observed, the employer–opera house “had 
the right to discharge [the plaintiff] on giving him the usual and 
customary notice . . . independent of the question whether he was 
competent” to remain employed.74  
As these cases indicate, there was no consistent rule in the United 
States with respect to notice. Over time, employers developed the 
practice of requiring employees to provide notice of voluntary 
departure, largely in response to efforts at worker organizing.75 The 
threat of breach of contract actions and wage withholding deterred 
workers from engaging in sudden strikes and other job actions.76 Some 
states passed laws effectively codifying a reciprocal notice requirement 
by precluding employers from pursuing claims against their workers if 
                                                                                                                     
 67. 113 Mass. 187, 190 (1873).  
 68. Id. at 189. 
 69. Id. at 188. 
 70. Id. at 190; see also Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419, 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861) 
(concluding that in the absence of a fixed duration, an employment contract with a vessel 
captain was “subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable notice, if the interest of 
either requires a change”); infra Section II.B (summarizing turn-of-the century Maryland case 
law referring to a reasonable notice requirement). 
 71. 10 N.Y. 108, 110–11 (1854). 
 72. Id. at 113. 
 73. 68 Ill. App. 376, 377–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1896). 
 74. Id. at 378; cf. The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1907) (finding “no evidence of 
any settled usage or custom of the port which would take the [marine engineer’s employment] 
contract . . . out of the [general] rule” that “a hiring at will [can] . . . be ended at any time, by 
either party, without notice”). 
 75. See Jacoby, supra note 28, at 107. 
 76. See id. at 106–07. 
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they had not similarly contracted to provide notice of termination.77 
Thus, for a time, a de facto employer notice obligation existed in the 
United States. But as the threat of labor unrest dissipated, so too did 
employer-imposed notice obligations and the reciprocal duty of 
employers. Ultimately, companies preferred the freedom to terminate 
without warning to the modest protection against concerted action and 
sudden departures afforded by employee notice obligations.  
In contrast, the law of the United Kingdom (and ultimately Canada) 
evolved to affirmatively require notice of termination.78 As in the 
United States, the advent of an industrial economy and the demand for 
shorter-term employment put pressure on a rule designed primarily for 
an agrarian society.79 However, British employers, faced with a more 
significant threat of worker unrest, were unwilling to completely 
abandon the idea of a contractual employment duration.80 By the mid-
nineteenth century, the United Kingdom’s one-year presumption began 
to be replaced by contracts of indefinite duration subject to notice, and 
Canada followed suit.81 Although such notice periods were generally 
short, often corresponding to the worker’s pay period, they continued to 
serve the purpose of binding workers to their employers for a minimum 
period of time. The resulting “implied reasonable notice term” was 
ultimately codified in the United Kingdom, with the statute requiring 
employers to provide a certain number of weeks’ notice (or its 
equivalent in severance pay) per year of service.82 The Canadian 
provinces similarly have statutory notice laws that set a “floor” for 
notice of termination,83 although contemporary Canadian law also 
maintains a common law reasonable notice obligation that may require 
employers to provide additional notice or pay.84 
In contrast,  notice remained a loose thread in American employment 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See id. 
 78. See Etheringon, supra note 29, at 472–73 (discussing development of the Canadian 
rule); Jacoby, supra note 28, at 100–01 (discussing development of the English rule). 
 79. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 122–24; Jacoby, supra note 28, at 
91. Another factor was the demise of British “settlement laws” that recognized individuals as 
citizens of a particular parish and entitled to its protections provided they had a contract for at 
least one year’s employment. Jacoby, supra note 28, at 88, 90; Etherington, supra note 29, at 
471–72. 
 80. See Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 122. 
 81. See id. at 121–22. 
 82. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 86 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/86. 
 83. See, e.g., Ontario Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 57 (Can.), available 
at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_00e41_e.htm#BK103. 
 84. See Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. 2d 140, paras. 12–14 (Can. Ont. 
High Ct. J.) (articulating the common law reasonable notice standard); GEOFFREY ENGLAND, 
ESSENTIALS OF CANADIAN LAW: INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 290–96 (2d ed. 2008) (detailing 
the interaction of common law and statutory notice requirements in Canada); infra Section V.A. 
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termination law. A century after Wood’s rule, the at-will doctrine had 
solidified as a substantive discretion rule permitting employers (and 
employees) to terminate without reason. Implicitly, it has also been 
understood as a procedural discretion rule permitting both parties to 
terminate without notice. However, the history of employment 
termination law both here and abroad demonstrates that there is no legal 
or historical reason why the right to terminate without notice must 
follow from the indefinite duration rule that Wood proposed.85 Indeed, 
both Canada and the United Kingdom ultimately abandoned the one-
year presumption and adopted a legal regime that requires advance 
notice.86  
In short, U.S. law on notice was as ambiguous as the law of 
employment duration at the time Wood articulated his rule. For better or 
for worse, Wood’s treatise laid down a rule on the issue of duration, but 
questions regarding notice remained open. As the next Part 
demonstrates, contemporary courts, unlike their counterparts abroad, 
have failed to pick up this issue, and the question of employee notice 
rights remains open.  
II.  NOTICE AND THE CONTEMPORARY AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
Since Wood’s time, there have been numerous developments in the 
common law of wrongful discharge. However, there has been almost no 
development in the law of notice. Unlike the idea that employers can 
terminate without reason, the idea that termination may occur without 
notice has not been explicitly and consistently articulated. Indeed, 
judicial statements of the employment at-will rule that reference the 
right of the parties to terminate without notice are the exception rather 
than the rule. As this Part describes, the law of only ten states can be 
characterized as purporting to allow employers to terminate at-will 
employees without notice.87 In some jurisdictions the principle is found 
in a single or small handful of cases, often in dicta and based on limited 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Cf. Feinman, Employment At Will, supra note 17, at 119 (noting that the “English, 
unlike the Americans, saw that the questions [of the duration of the relationship and the length 
of notice required to terminate it] were not the same and eventually developed a response to the 
second that mitigated somewhat the strictness of the early response to the first”). 
 86. Although contemporary British law also imposes a universal just cause rule, see 
Employment Rights Act §§ 94–98, outside a few provincial exceptions, Canada does not. 
Canadian law uses the term “wrongful dismissal” to refer to a termination without notice and the 
presence of cause supporting the employee’s termination is treated as a defense to his or her 
claim. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 324. But Canadian employers may terminate without 
cause if they provide the requisite notice. See id. at 65. Contemporary Canadian law thus 
provides an example of how a system of mandatory notice can exist alongside a system of 
substantive discretion reminiscent of American-style employment at will. 
 87. See infra Section I.A. 
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analysis.88 On the other end of the spectrum, the law in three states can 
be read to support an argument that employers are in fact required to 
provide some amount of advance notice when terminating at-will 
employees.89 These cases recognize a duty to provide “reasonable 
notice” alongside employers’ basic right to terminate at-will workers for 
any or no reason.  
This Part reviews existing law on notice of termination in at-will 
employment relationships.90 It reveals that procedural discretion—the 
ability to terminate without notice—is not a settled or intrinsic aspect of 
the employment at-will doctrine, but rather an open question distinct 
from whether the relationship was at will in the substantive discretion 
sense of the term. In fact, in most states there is no law that expressly 
holds that employers may terminate without notice, while in those states 
where “no notice” appears to be the rule, the issue remains ripe for 
challenge. 
A.  “No Notice” States 
It is often asserted that employment at will means employers can fire 
for any or no reason, “with or without notice.”91 Yet research reveals 
that there are relatively few jurisdictions that articulate the rule so 
broadly. Nearly two-thirds of states do not reference “notice” at all in 
their definition of employment at will.92 Cases in those jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See infra Section II.A. 
 89. See infra Section II.B. 
 90. The research for this section consisted of a fifty-state survey of primarily state court 
cases defining “employment at will” in the context of a wrongful termination claim brought by a 
private sector worker with no express contract. I excluded from consideration those cases 
involving public sector workers challenging an employer’s failure to provide notice as part of a 
constitutional due process claim and those cases involving workers alleging breach of an 
express contractual notice provision (usually, but not exclusively, in a written agreement). 
 91. Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of 
Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 707 (2006) (“The basic rule, applied by the vast 
majority of jurisdictions, concerning the at-will relationship—that either party may terminate the 
relationship at any time, for any reason or no reason, and with or without notice—has been the 
law in the United States for well over a century.”); John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The 
Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 
152 (1998) (“Pursuant to the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer can discharge a worker 
for any legal reason or for no reason, with or without notice.”).  
 92. See infra Appendix A. Two of these “open” states, as I refer to them, require further 
explanation. In Connecticut there is a contemporary decision rejecting an at-will employee’s 
claim for negligent inflection of emotional distress in which the court observed that “lack of 
advance warning or written notification is insufficient evidence that an employer acted 
unreasonably in terminating an employee-at-will.” Thompson v. Bridgeport Hosp., No. CV 
980352686, 1999 WL 1212310, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1999). However, the decision, 
which ruled on defendant’s motion to strike, addressed only the plaintiff’s negligence claim and 
not her contract claims. In addition, the plaintiff had received both advance warning that her 
department was closing and one month’s oral notice of her date of termination. In another of 
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hold that employment is “at will,” but in explaining the doctrine state 
only that parties can terminate for any or no reason. They do not go on 
to add that termination may be with or without notice.93 Such 
formulations clearly embrace the substantive discretion principle of 
employment at will. Yet the process by which such discretionary 
terminations are to be effected—with or without advance notice, 
warning, or continuing obligations—is an open question in such 
jurisdictions.  
In contrast, only nine states have case law that arguably recognizes a 
right to terminate at-will employment relationships without advance 
warning. These “no notice” states have either held, stated, or implied 
that an at-will employee may be terminated without notice.94  
However, this is a generous classification. In many of these 
jurisdictions, the no notice rule is neither well established nor well 
supported. In three states—Colorado, Oregon, and Ohio—there are no 
                                                                                                                     
these states, New Jersey, there is an early twentieth century decision rejecting a claim of a city 
contractor based on failure to provide notice of termination. See Miller v. Atlantic City, 74 
N.J.L. 345, 346 (1907). While the court refers to the termination as “at will,” it appears that the 
employee was terminated pursuant to a satisfaction clause in his written contract permitting 
immediate termination upon his unreasonable delay. See id. 347. There appears to be no other 
articulation of the employment at-will rule by a New Jersey state court that refers to the right to 
terminate without notice. For these reasons, I characterize Connecticut and New Jersey as 
“open” states in which the notice issue has not been decided. 
 93. Most jurisdictions do, however, define employment at will as the ability to terminate 
“at any time.” One could argue that such language precludes an interpretation of employment at 
will that requires the employer to supply advance notice, insofar as such an obligation delays the 
time at which a firing can be effectuated. If the employer must provide notice, it is unable to 
execute the termination immediately. This reading of “at any time” is unlikely however.  
Although there appears to be no case elaborating on the phrase, it is notable that the words “at 
any time” are not found exclusively in jurisdictions that explicitly adopt the “no notice” version 
of employment at will. In fact, language referring to the employer’s ability to terminate “at any 
time” can be found in the same jurisdictions, and sometimes in the same cases, that explicitly 
refer to an obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination. See, e.g., Studer v. Hurley, 82 
Va. Cir. 406, 407 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011) (“One of the incidents of employment at will is the ability 
of either party to terminate the relationship with or without cause at any time, upon giving 
reasonable notice.”); Rubin v. Maloney, 75 Va. Cir. 452, 453 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (“Virginia has 
long adhered to the common law doctrine of employment ‘at will’ where when a term of 
employment cannot be determined from the contract, either party is at liberty to terminate the 
contract at any time for any reason, upon reasonable notice.”); Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D. 
& C.3d 599, 601 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1985) (“An employment contract which has no definite 
duration is a hiring at-will, and may be terminated upon reasonable notice by either party at any 
time.”). The better understanding of “at any time” language is that it refers to the indefinite 
duration rule, that is, it embodies the American rejection of the British one-year presumption.  
 94. There are an additional eight states with conflicting case law on this issue. See infra 
Appendix A. The case law in these states includes decisions that either recognize or refer to an 
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination, as well as decisions that either explicitly 
reject a reasonable notice claim or refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or 
without notice.” The law of these jurisdictions is discussed infra Section II.C. 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/2
2014] MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 1533 
 
reported state court decisions addressing a substantive claim by an at-
will employee challenging the failure to provide notice of termination. 
Rather, in these states, courts simply define at-will employment as the 
ability to fire with or without reason and with or without notice.95 The 
plaintiffs’ claims in these cases challenge only the reason for the 
employer’s termination, not the absence of any advance warning or 
severance pay. In other words, the “without notice” portion of the 
courts’ rule statements in these cases is dicta.96  
In another three jurisdictions, statutory law suggests, though it does 
not explicitly state, that employment may not be terminated without 
notice. The state statutes of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana 
specifically provide that either party may terminate an at-will 
employment relationship “on notice” to the other.97 These references 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See, e.g., Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); 
Bauserman v. Katy Steel & Alum. Co., No. WD-85-17, 1986 WL 1689, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1986); Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC, 201 P.3d 920, 923 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).  
 96. In addition to being dicta, such “no notice” formulations of the at-will rule are often 
unsupported by legal precedent. Courts generally cite early state supreme court decisions that 
adopt employment at will, but which themselves contain no reference to notice of termination in 
either the case facts or the court’s statement of the law. For instance, in Colorado, the language 
“without notice” first appears in that state’s case law in Cont’l Air Lines, 731 P.2d at 711. All 
subsequent court references to the ability to terminate without notice cite either Continental Air 
Lines or cases citing Continental Air Lines. None of the cases cited by the Colorado Supreme 
Court in Continental Air Lines, however, contain any reference to notice; each refers to 
employment at will as the ability to terminate without reason. See Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., 752 
F.2d 488, 491 (10th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 
(D. Colo. 1983); Johnson v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Health, 662 P.2d 463, 471 (Colo. 1983); 
Hughes v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 686 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. App. 1984); Lampe v. 
Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo. 1978); Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 530 
P.2d 984, 985 (Colo. 1974). Thus, the Colorado “no notice” language is a judicial creation of the 
last quarter century, one without support from any precedent in the state. 
 97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (West 2014) (“An employment having no specified 
term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, except when otherwise 
provided by this title.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-4 (“An employment having no specified 
term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, unless otherwise 
provided by statute.”). Although Montana has legislatively overruled the substantive discretion 
principle of employment at will, its “just cause” statute includes an exception for “probationary” 
(i.e., at will) employees, which contains notice language identical to that in North Dakota and 
South Dakota. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2)(a) (2000) (“During a probationary period 
of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the 
employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason.” (emphasis added)). In addition, 
the Montana statute explicitly preempts common law contract claims. Id. § 39-2-913. Thus, 
while employment at will is the exception rather than the rule in Montana, it is appropriate to 
conclude that Montana employers have both substantive and procedural discretion with respect 
to at-will employees. 
A fourth state, California, has a statute containing notice language similar to that in North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 2014) (“An 
employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to 
the other. Employment for a specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on 
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suggest that the terminating party must notify the losing party, that is, 
make the employee aware of its decision. An explicit requirement of 
actual notice could be said to belie any requirement of advance notice, 
and at least a few courts in Montana have seemingly made that 
assumption.98  
In each of the remaining three states, there is at least one state court 
decision that rejects a challenge to the failure to provide notice of 
termination in an at-will employment relationship. In only one of these 
states, Hawaii, the relevant case is on point and the ruling is explicit, 
although the decision is old and the reasoning spare. In 1920, the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a notice claim in Crawford v. 
Stewart, a one-page decision containing no explanation of the case 
facts.99 The full explanation of its decision is as follows:  
In answer to plaintiff’s contention that the majority opinion 
overlooked the fact that no notice whatever was given of 
any intention to terminate the contract we hold that the 
requirement of such notice would abrogate entirely the 
main principle laid down in our opinion to the effect that a 
hiring for a stipulated sum per month without anything 
further being agreed upon to fix the term of hiring 
constitutes an indefinite hiring and is terminable at the will 
of either party.100 
Explicit though it may be, this precedent is an isolated decision. There 
appears to be no reported state court decision referencing the ability to 
terminate without notice since Crawford was issued nearly one hundred 
years ago. 
                                                                                                                     
notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater 
than one month.”). However, there is case law in California that presumes the existence of a 
common law “reasonable notice” requirement. See, e.g., Consol. Theatres, Inc., v. Theatrical 
Stage Emps. Union, Local 16, 447 P.2d 325, 337 (Cal. 1968) (stating that seven months 
constituted reasonable notice of termination of union contract between theater and stagehand 
employees). For this reason, I classify California as a “reasonable notice” state. See infra 
Section II.B. 
 98. See Scott v. Eagle Watch Invs., Inc., 828 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Mont. 1991) (holding that 
the employer met the statutory notice requirement by informing the athletic club manager that 
his employment was terminated); Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Mont. 
1982) (asserting that Montana statutory law “does not require prior notice”). Both Scott and 
Gates were decided under Montana’s employment at-will rule, which was in effect prior to the 
passage of the Montana Wrongful Discharge in Employment Act (MWDEA). That statute 
contained notice language identical to what appears in the probationary employee exception to 
the MWDEA. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1986) (“Except as limited in this part, 
employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either the employer or 
the employee on notice to the other for any reason considered sufficient by the terminating 
party.”). 
 99. 25 Haw. 300, 300–01 (1920). 
 100. Id. at 300. 
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In the remaining two states—Alabama and Michigan—the law is 
somewhat more opaque. The state court decisions that sanction 
termination at will without notice to the losing party are factually 
idiosyncratic. For instance, in the only Alabama case to reference notice 
of at-will termination, Allied Supply Co., Inc. v. Brown, the employer 
sued its former employees arguing that they had breached their 
fiduciary duties by, among other things, conspiring to depart en masse 
without warning.101 The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the 
principle of employment at will precluded an interpretation of the 
fiduciary duty doctrine that would prohibit employees from quitting 
immediately: “Implicit in the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine is the 
concept that an employee at will can be discharged, or, conversely, can 
terminate his employment, without prior notice.”102 Thus, while the 
court was explicit about the right to terminate at-will relationships 
without notice, it made such assertions in the context of protecting an 
employee’s right to quit and engage in postemployment competition.  
In the Michigan case, Garavaglia v. Centra, the primary issue was 
not notice but whether the plaintiff’s consulting contract contemplated a 
fixed or indefinite period of employment.103 Although the Michigan 
appellate court found that the contract was at will, it affirmed the trial 
court’s award of two quarters’ retainer fees to the plaintiff, concluding 
that the plaintiff had not been properly notified that the contract had 
been cancelled.104 Explaining this decision, the court made clear that 
parties need not provide prior notice of termination under employment 
at will:  
Defendants correctly note that in cases of employment 
terminable at will, notice is not required by either party. 
However, such notice relates to the advance warning of 
intended action. While defendants were not required to give 
advance notice of their intentions to terminate the parties’ 
agreement, defendants should have notified plaintiff that 
the contract was terminated.105 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. 1991). 
 102. Id. In support of its conclusion, the court cited three other Alabama Supreme Court 
cases, all of which refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or without cause 
or justification,” and contain no reference to notice. See Bell v. S. Cent. Bell, 564 So. 2d 46, 48 
(Ala. 1990); Bailey v. Intergraph Corp., 537 So. 2d 21, 21 (Ala. 1988); Martin v. Tapley, 360 
So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978). It appears that no other state court decision has addressed the issue. 
 103. Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., No. 196203, 1998 WL 1991630, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 104. Id. at *2, *4. Apparently the defendant stopped paying the plaintiff’s retainer fees, but 
did not otherwise communicate that it considered the contract terminated, and the plaintiff 
assumed that the defendant was merely late with his payment. Id. at *4. 
 105. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
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Thus, while the court explicitly rejected the notion of an advance notice 
requirement, the claim in the case rested on the failure to provide actual 
notice of termination and the employee was awarded lost salary.106  
In sum, while there is some case law asserting that at-will 
termination may occur without advance notice, that law is neither as 
prevalent nor as inviolate as one might expect. Only a small minority of 
states have explicitly articulated a “no notice” rule, and several have 
done so only in dicta. Where there is case law on point it is not 
especially well analyzed or supported, and in several states, the relevant 
cases are old and idiosyncratic. In short, the “no notice” rule, to the 
extent it exists, is vulnerable to challenge.  
B.  Reasonable Notice States 
In contrast, the law in a small handful of states appears to require 
employers to provide “reasonable notice” of at-will employment 
termination.107 The principal is neither well developed nor consistently 
cited and applied. However, the existence of this admittedly slim body 
of law offers a model for how an obligation to provide advance notice 
of termination can comfortably exist alongside a right to terminate for 
any or no reason.  
In three jurisdictions—California, Maryland, and Florida—there is 
state case law that either requires an employer to provide advance notice 
of termination or refers to or assumes such an obligation in dicta.108 In 
one of the three, there is no case precisely on point. In California, there 
are cases that refer to “reasonable notice” of termination, but they do 
not involve claims that specifically target the employer’s failure to 
provide advance notice.109 Such judicial references to reasonable notice 
are arguably no more reliable as a reflection of extant law than 
references to the ability to discharge “with or without notice” in cases 
that similarly involve general challenges to the employer’s reasons for 
                                                                                                                     
 106. See id.  
 107. See infra Appendix A. 
 108. There are an additional eight states—Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia—with conflicting case law on this issue. See infra 
Appendix A. The case law in these states includes decisions that either recognize or refer to an 
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination, as well as decisions that either explicitly 
reject a reasonable notice claim or refer to employment at will as the right to terminate “with or 
without notice.” The law of these jurisdictions is discussed infra Section II.C. 
 109. See, e.g., Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emps. Union, Local 16, 447 P.2d 
325, 337 (Cal. 1968) (stating that seven months constituted reasonable notice of termination of 
union contract between theater and stagehand employees); Mile v. Cal. Growers Wineries, Inc., 
114 P.2d 651, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (noting that, in an action by wine salesperson to 
recover sales commissions, the employment contract was terminable at will upon reasonable 
notice). 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/2
2014] MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 1537 
 
terminating.110  
However, the law in the remaining two states is more explicit. 
Maryland case law includes a pair of turn-of-the-century decisions that 
articulate and implicitly apply a reasonable notice rule. In Stubbs v. 
Vestry of St. John’s Church, the plaintiff had served as a rector for over 
twenty-two years when he was removed from office by resolution of the 
vestry.111 The resolution was passed in May, effective the end of July.112 
The state’s highest court held that the rector’s appointment contained no 
fixed term of employment and consequently could be terminated at will 
upon reasonable notice, which had been received.113 To a similar effect 
is Bartlett v. Hipkins, also involving a rector, in which the plaintiff 
received notice of termination on November 15, effective January 1.114 
The court reversed an injunction in favor of the rector.115 Although the 
court relied primarily on statutory law granting vestries the right to 
choose their ministers,116 the concurring opinion in the case explained 
the role of notice in tempering the effect of vestry authority:  
[W]hile the vestry may have such right to terminate the 
contract with the rector, the right must always be exercised 
with due regard to the principles of justice, depending upon 
the circumstances of the case. Reasonable notice is 
essential . . . .117 
The judge went on to note that reasonable notice (approximately six 
weeks) had been given and was not challenged.118  
The same principles can be found in the contemporary state court 
decisions of Florida. The key case, Perri v. Byrd, involved a suit by 
                                                                                                                     
 110. It is interesting to consider, however, that, the key California case referencing a 
reasonable notice rule for indefinite employment contracts is a case involving a collective 
bargaining agreement. Consol. Theatres, Inc., 447 P.2d at 328. In Consolidated Theaters, the 
parties had entered into an agreement requiring, among other things, that the theater employ 
union stagehands. Id. at 329. Subsequently, the theater transitioned from a live performance 
venue to one showing motion pictures. Id. When union employees picketed because of the 
theater’s failure to use stagehands, the court held that the contract was no longer binding and 
that the union had effectively given “reasonable notice” of termination seven months prior when 
it threatened to picket. Id. at 337. Thus, while there is no individual employment contract case in 
California that holds that parties must provide reasonable notice of termination, there is such a 
holding in the labor relations context. See id. But see, supra note 99 and accompanying text 
(discussing California’s codification of employment at will which refers to termination “on 
notice to the other” party). 
 111. 53 A. 917, 917 (Md. 1903).  
 112. Id. at 919.  
 113. Id.  
 114. 23 A. 1089, 1090 (Md. 1892). 
 115. Id. at 1093. 
 116. Id. at 1092–93. 
 117. Id. at 1093.  
 118. Id.  
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members of a band against a restaurant that had hired the group to play 
weekly over the summer.119 After the plaintiffs accepted the offer of 
employment, but prior to their first performance, the band’s former 
employer threatened to sue the defendant, prompting it to rescind its 
offer.120 The band sued the new employer, seeking damages for the 
amount it would have earned over the course of the summer.121 
Reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the band, the Florida District Court 
of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the offer of employment 
for the summer created a fixed term, finding the relationship one of 
indefinite duration and therefore terminable at will.122 However, it held 
that notwithstanding the defendant’s right to terminate at any time, it 
was obligated to provide reasonable notice of termination.123 It went on 
to conclude that two weeks’ notice was reasonable, based on 
“customary” business practices, and awarded the band two weeks’ 
pay.124  
This case law support for a reasonable notice rule is not robust. In 
Florida, courts have cited and relied on Perri, but the universe of cases 
challenging the failure to provide notice is small,125 and the issue has 
                                                                                                                     
 119. 436 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Given the nature of the services 
provided by the band, it would appear questionable whether a true employment—as opposed to 
independent contractor—relationship was intended. However, this issue was not recognized by 
the court (and presumably was not raised by the parties). The court opinion explicitly treats the 
relationship as one of employment. See id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 361. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. The court subtracted the amount of money the band had earned at other venues 
during the notice period from its damages award. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Rehman v. ECC Int’l Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that at-will employees may be entitled to payment equivalent to wages 
earned in a reasonable notice period); Malver v. Sheffield Indus., Inc., 502 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the employer complied with the reasonable notice obligation 
by providing the employee one week’s severance pay); Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A., 
490 So. 2d 993, 996–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a prospective employee who 
relocated from Britain for a job offer could be awarded damages arising from the accounting 
firm’s failure to provide reasonable notice of termination of the employment offer); cf. Settle v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 91-0028-Civ-Orl-18, 1992 WL 210986, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 1992) 
(noting that the employer provided four months’ advance notice of termination consistent with 
its obligation to provide reasonable notice in rejecting employee’s claim that the employer 
breached principles of good faith and fair dealing); Payroll, Inc. v. Elicker, 668 So. 2d 1035, 
1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that where the employer terminated immediately 
without notice, injuries sustained by the employee during the time period that would have 
constituted reasonable notice of termination were considered to have occurred prior to 
termination for purposes of workers compensation coverage. But see Motwani v. Oceancity Inv., 
Ltd., 682 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing without explanation that the 
court’s refusal to allow a set-off to the plaintiff in awarding damages to the defendant conflicted 
with Perri v. Byrd).  
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never reached the state supreme court.126 In Maryland, it appears that no 
state court has revisited the issue since Stubbs was decided over a 
century ago. The point, however, is not that “reasonable notice” is the 
de facto rule in any particular jurisdiction, but rather that it could be. 
Cases like Stubbs and Perri, challenge the notion that the privilege to 
terminate without notice is implicit in the doctrine of employment at 
will. In each, the court presumes a system that allows parties subjective 
discretion to terminate, but conditions the exercise of that right on a 
degree of procedural fairness achieved through the provision of advance 
notice.  
C.  Mixed Law States 
In eight jurisdictions, the law regarding notice of at-will termination 
is either unclear or in conflict. Like the law of most of the jurisdictions 
discussed thus far, the case law in these “mixed law” states is limited 
and often does not directly address the precise factual question. In two 
states—Tennessee and Texas—there are decisions referring both to the 
ability to terminate without notice and the need to provide reasonable or 
some other form of notice.127 However, such language appears 
exclusively in cases that do not involve actual challenges to the failure 
to provide notice. Thus, in Texas, there are references to parties’ ability 
to terminate “without notice or cause,”128 “on giving reasonable 
notice,”129 on “reasonably short notice,”130 on “giv[ing] actual 
                                                                                                                     
 126. The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged Perri, but deemed it inapplicable to the 
facts in City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So. 2d 450, 453–54 (Fla. 1992). 
 127. In Tennessee, compare Lee v. City of LaVergne, No. M2001-02098-COA-R3-CV, 
2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the police department employee 
was an at-will employee who could therefore “be terminated for good cause, bad cause or no 
cause at all, without notice”), with Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (presuming that at-will employees are entitled to reasonable notice of 
termination in concluding that a maintenance mechanic accused of stealing customer property 
would not have been entitled to notice because he was terminated for cause). In Texas, compare 
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring) (stating that 
human resources director’s status as an at-will employee who could be terminated without 
notice or cause did not foreclose the possibility that she may have a viable claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against her former employer for the way in which she was 
terminated), with Island Lake Oil Co. v. Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 
(quoting general rule that “‘when a contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is so far 
incomplete as that the period of its intended duration cannot be determined by a fair inference 
from its provisions, either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving 
reasonable notice of his intention to do so’” in holding that an oil driller’s employment contract 
for indefinite duration was terminable circumstances implying actual notice of termination). 
 128. Wornick Co., 856 S.W.2d at 737; Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Hale, 237 S.W.2d 769, 
772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). 
 129. Island Lake Oil Co., 244 S.W. at 195. 
 130. Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App. 1987). 
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notice,”131 and “just by giving notice to the other [party],”132 sometimes 
in the same case and absent any analysis. Such states are arguably no 
different than “open states” with respect to the prevailing rule of law. 
In four states—Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and 
Pennsylvania—there is turn-of-the-century case law addressing the 
issue of notice, but more recent decisions suggesting a different rule.133 
The more recent decisions in these jurisdictions, however, either contain 
references to notice only in dicta or discuss the issue under inapposite 
facts. In New York, for instance, there is a nineteenth century decision 
recognizing that an employer owes terminated workers customary 
notice,134 while a twentieth century decision involving employee 
fiduciary duties concludes that at-will employees need not provide 
notice prior to voluntarily terminating.135 In addition, the contemporary 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Island Lake Oil Co., 244 S.W. at 194. 
 132. Mackey v. U.P. Enters., Inc., No. 12-99-00355-CV, 2005 WL 1798408, at *2 (Tex. 
App. 2005) (quoting, and upholding as proper, the trial court’s instruction on the meaning of at 
will); see also McKinney, 271 S.W. at 249 (holding that employment at will was terminable 
without the other party’s consent “upon notice to that effect”). 
 133. In Massachusetts, compare Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d 
411, 412–13 (Mass. 1988) (holding that, because employment center supervisor who had been 
accused of sexual harassment was an at-will employee, he could be terminated “without notice[] 
for almost any reason or for no reason at all”), with Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187, 187–90 
(1873) (holding that, after the contractually fixed term of employment expired, the employer 
was free to terminate his “color maker” employee upon reasonable notice). In Missouri, 
compare Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo. 1903) (rejecting a claim by 
workers terminated without notice and blacklisted for union activity, concluding that “in a free 
country like ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer 
without notice, and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge 
his employ[ee], with or without notice, at any time”), with Paisley v. Lucas, 143 S.W.2d 262, 
271 (Mo. 1940) (stating that insurance agent’s employment contract for an indefinite term was 
terminable upon reasonable notice), and Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407, 
415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (noting, in an action to recover sales commissions, that a contract 
between manufacturer and salesperson was terminable upon reasonable notice because it 
included no provision for the intended period of duration). In Pennsylvania, compare Neal v. 
Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D. & C. 599, 601 (1985) (reciting as the general rule that parties may 
terminate at will “upon reasonable notice”), with Cofin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864) 
(finding that a sales agent could be terminated at will and that “no notice was necessary”). For 
citations to conflicting decision in New York, see infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
See also supra Section I.B (discussing the historical law of these three states). 
 134.  See Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108, 113 (1854) (accepting the principle that 
customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker, but finding that the plaintiff–newspaper 
carrier had not established the custom of providing one month’s notice); see also Ward v. 
Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861) (stating that a vessel owner’s contract with 
a ship captain “must be considered as subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable 
notice”). 
 135. See Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 728 
(N.Y. 1958) (holding that where an employer sued its former home cleaning employees who left 
to start a competing business, notice by the former employees of their intent to leave would have 
been a “courteous” gesture, but it was not required); see also Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 
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cases in these four jurisdictions neither address nor identify the 
inconsistency with historical precedents. For these reasons, it is difficult 
to characterize the law of these states as supporting either a “no notice” 
or a “reasonable notice” rule.  
In the remaining two states—Louisiana and Virginia—the 
contemporary law is ambiguous or in conflict. The situation in 
Louisiana is idiosyncratic. There the state code provides that contracts 
of indefinite duration require reasonable notice of termination,136 but 
courts and commentators are unclear as to when and whether this 
admonition applies to employment relationships.137 In Virginia, by 
contrast, there are contemporary decisions affirmatively recognizing an 
obligation to provide reasonable notice of termination to at-will 
employees alongside those specifically rejecting a reasonable notice 
obligation.138  
Since at least the early twentieth century, the reported case law in 
Virginia has consistently defined employment at will as permitting 
termination at any time and for any reason upon “reasonable notice.” As 
the state supreme court stated in Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville 
                                                                                                                     
753, 755, 758–59 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a doctor, employed as Associate Medical Director 
by a newspaper, was subject to the at-will employment rule and could be terminated “at any 
time without cause or notice”); Kotick v. Desai, 123 A.D.2d 744, 744–45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 
(holding that an employer’s promise of permanent employment to an orthodontist was merely 
at-will employment permitting either party to terminate the relationship “without advance 
notice”); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding that 
an employee discharged for fighting with a coworker did not have an employment contract for a 
specified term and thus he was an at-will employee who could be discharged at any time 
“without advance notice”). 
 136. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013) (providing that a “contract of unspecified 
duration” may be terminated at will by either party “by giving notice, reasonable in time and 
form”). 
 137. Compare Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1988) 
(asserting in an employment termination case that “[a] contract for an indefinite period is 
terminable at the will of either party upon giving reasonable notice”); 6 EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West, updated Apr. 2014) (“Under the Louisiana Civil 
Code[] . . . oral contracts for employment of indefinite duration are terminable at any time at the 
will of either party upon reasonable notice.”), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4, with 
Finkle v. Majik Mkt., 628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where an 
assistant manager of a retail store had a “simple, at-will employment” relationship with his 
former employer and there was “no specific contract between” the parties, Article 2024 did not 
apply and the manager could be terminated without notice), and Harrison v. CD Consulting, 
Inc., 2006 WL 1194749 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that an at-will employee was 
not required to provide advance notice of departure in rejecting employer’s breach of fiduciary 
duty claim). See generally La. Prac. Employment Law § 12:7 (2013-2014 ed.) (“Although Civil 
Code art. 2024 requires notice ‘reasonable in time and form’ prior to termination, at-will 
employment contracts generally require no notice of termination.”); infra Parts III.A and IV.A 
(discussing Louisiana law). 
 138. For a summary of conflicting cases in Virginia, see infra, notes 140–43 and 
accompanying text. 
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& Nashville Railroad Co.: 
[W]hen a contract calls for the rendition of services, if it is 
so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration 
cannot be determined by a fair inference from its 
provisions, either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate 
it at will on giving reasonable notice of his intention to do 
so.139 
Initially, this formulation of the rule appeared exclusively in cases in 
which notice was not explicitly at issue.140 Since the late 1980s, 
however, the state circuit courts, primarily in unreported decisions, have 
applied Stonega to notice-based claims. These courts find that 
employees state a claim for breach of the at-will employment contract 
where the employer terminates immediately without advance 
warning.141 What constitutes reasonable notice in such cases is usually 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 55 S.E. 551, 552 (Va. 1906) 
(emphasis added). 
 140. See, e.g., Cnty. of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. 2001); Doss v. Jamco, 
Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Va. 1997); Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 428, 429 
(Va. 1992); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Va. 1985); Wards Co. v. 
Lewis & Dobrow, Inc., 173 S.E.2d 861, 865 (Va. 1970); Stutzman v. C.A. Nash & Son, 53 
S.E.2d 45, 49 (Va. 1949); Studer v. Hurley, 82 Va. Cir. 406, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011); Rubin v. 
Am. Soc’y of Travel Agents, Inc., 78 Va. Cir. 1, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008); Brehm v. Mathis, 59 
Va. Cir. 31, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002); Andrews v. Bon Secours-St. Mary’s Hosp. of Richmond, 
Inc., 43 Va. Cir. 486, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Wilt v. Water & Wastewater Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 
43 Va. Cir. 118, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 
451, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Parsley v. Jones & Frank Corp., 40 Va. Cir. 286, at *1 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1996); Handley v. Boy Scouts of Am., 32 Va. Cir. 524, at *9 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992); Bowman v. 
Rappahannock Elec. Coop., 13 Va. Cir. 290, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988). 
 141. See, e.g., Laudenslager v. Loral, 39 Va. Cir. 228, 229 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (holding that 
an employer’s failure to give its at-will employee reasonable notice of termination gave rise to 
an action for breach of implied contract); Tingle, 41 Va. Cir., at *1, *3 (holding that a pregnant 
employee who was fired without notice after slightly more than seven months of employment 
could recover damages for her employer’s failure to provide reasonable notice of termination); 
Slade v. Cent. Fid. Bank, N.A., 12 Va. Cir. 291, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (holding that a teller 
who was employed for twenty-four years was entitled to damages arising from the bank’s failure 
to provide reasonable notice of termination); Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir. 163, at 
*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (holding that the jury properly awarded damages to the employee where 
the employer failed to give reasonable notice of termination). Cf. Person v. Bell Atl.-Va., Inc., 
993 F. Supp. 958, 962 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that because telephone service technician’s 
employment contract was governed by a collective bargaining agreement, his claim based on the 
default at-will rule in Virginia requiring employers to provide “reasonable notice of 
termination” was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act). It is possible that this 
trend began long before the late 1980s but became more widely known only upon the advent of 
electronic research offering access to what are primarily unreported decisions requiring 
reasonable notice. 
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left for the jury.142 
Recent developments have called this law into question. A series of 
cases applying Virginia law have rejected employee claims for failure to 
provide reasonable notice, concluding that an obligation to provide 
notice is antithetical to employment at will.143 Perry v. American Home 
Products, a federal district court case, appears to have begun the 
trend.144 American Home involved a chemist who had been employed 
for twelve years prior to being terminated in a dispute over 
pharmaceutical testing procedures.145 The plaintiff’s principal claim was 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; his secondary claim 
was that the employer was liable for failing to provide notice of 
termination, or as the court put it, that “the at-will-doctrine does not 
apply when an employee is discharged without ‘reasonable notice.’”146  
The court acknowledged the repeated references in Virginia’s case 
law to reasonable notice of termination, but concluded that such 
statements were fairly characterized as dicta.147 It noted that the 
Supreme Court of Virginia had never applied its reasonable notice rule, 
and had in fact strongly adhered to the at-will principle, recognizing 
only limited exceptions to the doctrine.148 In contrast, the court asserted 
that sanctioning a notice claim would “eviscerate the at-will doctrine 
itself.”149 It explained: 
No employee-employer relationship in Virginia could truly 
be “at-will” if an at-will employee has a valid claim, 
whether for breach of implied contract or in tort, when 
reasonable notice is not given before termination. The 
recognition of this new action would permit every 
discharged employee to sue the employer on the theory that 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See, e.g., Tingle, 41 Va. Cir., at *3 (holding that the length of a reasonable notice 
period depends on the cause of discharge); Slade, 12 Va. Cir., at *1 (holding that “the defendant 
can by bill of particulars or discovery discern the basis for plaintiff’s claim of damages due to 
lack of reasonable notice”); Braunfeld, 12 Va. Cir., at *3 (rejecting defendant’s argument that an 
employee must provide evidence to show what timeframe constitutes reasonable notice in a 
given trade or industry and holding that the jury was well qualified—based on inferences drawn 
from evidence, common sense, and collective experience—to determine what constituted a 
reasonable notice period).  
 143. See, e.g., Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–
9 (E.D. Va. 1997); Rubin, 78 Va. Cir., at *3; Brehm, 59 Va. Cir., at *2. 
 144. See Perry, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (explaining that “a ‘reasonable notice’ exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine would effectively eviscerate the at-will doctrine itself”).  
 145. Id. at *1. 
 146. Id. at *3. 
 147. Id. at *8; see also Brehm, 59 Va. Cir., at *2–3 (asserting that prior decisions imposing 
a reasonable notice requirement “rest upon taking a few words out of the definition of at will 
employment” in rejecting reasonable notice claim). 
 148. Perry, 1997 WL 109658, at *3. 
 149. Id. at *9. 
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the employer breached its implied duty to provide 
reasonable notice. What is “reasonable” is a question of 
fact, and thus every case filed would have to be decided by 
the finder of fact.150 
Noting that “serious policy considerations, affecting countless business 
relationships” would be implicated in such a “substantial alteration” of 
the rule, it concluded that the notice issue should be left to the state 
legislature.151 
The rationale for the court’s rejection of a reasonable notice rule is 
revealing. American Home posits a fundamental inconsistency between 
employment at will and notice, but its concerns are functional rather 
than doctrinal. The supposed incompatibility derives from the risk of 
litigation over reasonableness that would presumably chill employers’ 
exercise of substantive discretion. Such concerns are real, but the 
analysis is incomplete. Courts can temper administrative challenges 
through careful formulation of doctrine, and to the extent they cannot, 
that is merely one of many policy considerations at stake in the 
development of the at-will doctrine. Whatever burdens and costs it 
might impose, reasonable notice also offers fair warning and a modest 
income cushion to vulnerable workers. Such considerations, which go 
unmentioned in American Home, may be worth the tradeoff. 
For these reasons, it is not unreasonable to suggest, as American 
Home does, that the legislature is the best body to formalize and 
elaborate on a notice requirement. But such a preference does not 
permit courts to sit idle. In fact, American Home’s reference to judicial 
role is ironic. Prior to the district court’s decision, all Virginia state 
court cases that had addressed the issue recognized a reasonable notice 
claim, and the language on this point in Stonega, whatever the scope of 
the issues in the case, is perfectly clear. The federal court’s choice to 
take the law in a different direction based on such a limited analysis is 
surprising at best.152 The employment at-will doctrine, and the 
principles of contract law of which it is ostensibly a part, are ultimately 
common law inventions. It is appropriate for state trial courts to 
interpret that law to require parties to supply reasonable notice of 
termination if such a reading is doctrinally justified. Part III argues that 
it is.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 919 (Va. 1987)). 
 152. At worst, it is a violation of the Erie doctrine, which requires federal courts exercising 
diversity jurisdiction to apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit. Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  
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III.  THE CONTRACT CASE FOR NOTICE 
Part II suggested that while the law is clear that employment at will 
permits parties substantive discretion to determine whether to terminate, 
the procedural obligations of the parties in executing termination are 
unsettled. This Part takes the first step in building a common law case 
for an obligation to provide reasonable notice of at-will employment 
termination by appealing to general contract law. It identifies three 
doctrines or legal theories through which courts interpreting 
nonemployment contracts have imposed a reasonable notice obligation 
on parties to an indefinite relationship: the use of reasonable gap fillers, 
the implied duty of good faith, and the doctrine of consideration. 
Although each of these approaches has an established doctrinal 
foundation, they are not equal in terms of their potential to support a 
robust entitlement to notice of termination in the employment context. 
As will be seen, the law of contract gap fillers offers the strongest 
doctrinal support for a right to notice, while arguments based on 
consideration rely on more creative analysis. At the same time, treating 
reasonable notice as a gap filler yields only a default obligation to 
provide notice of termination that parties (and certainly employers) are 
capable of avoiding through written agreements that restore a “no 
notice” regime. In contrast, a consideration-based analysis treats notice 
as a substantive element of the contract necessary for contract formation 
and enforcement.  
A.  Reasonable Notice as a Contract Gap Filler 
Once upon a time, the law of contracts required a requisite degree of 
specificity for contract enforcement. Where parties failed to provide 
sufficient detail, a court would conclude that there had been no meeting 
of the minds and the claim for breach would fail.153 This is no longer the 
dominant view. Contemporary courts typically supply missing terms in 
an agreement where the requisite intent to be bound can be discerned.154 
Indeed, mainstream contracts literature recognizes that most contracts 
are to some degree “incomplete,” in that they often fail to expressly set 
forth all of the parties’ obligations or anticipate possible 
contingencies.155 Whether such “gaps” result from drafting failures or 
failures of the imagination,156 courts will attempt to fill them, either by 
determining the parties’ intent with respect to the particular issue or by 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See generally 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 569 (rev. ed. 
1993). 
 154. See id. § 4.3, at 569–70. 
 155. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989). 
 156. See id. at 92, 94 (exploring the different ways in which, and reasons why, contracts 
may be incomplete vis-à-vis a particular future contingency). 
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applying an accepted default rule.157  
Termination at will is itself a default rule, applied in situations where 
parties fail to specify the duration of their relationship and possible 
reasons for termination. In this respect, employment law and general 
contract law are aligned.158 In the case of indefinite commercial 
agreements and other long-term nonemployment contracts, however, 
courts generally supply a reasonable notice term in the absence of any 
express provision regarding the process for termination.159  
The clearest authority for this principle is Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which codifies a series of default rules applicable to 
commercial agreements. The touchstone for most of these defaults is 
reasonableness: parties are obligated to pay a “reasonable” price,160 
deliver goods within a “reasonable” time,161 and set reasonable 
quantities in instances where the governing contract does not provide a 
more specific rule.162 The default rules with respect to contract 
termination are consistent with this approach. Section 2-309 provides 
that commercial relationships of indefinite duration are terminable at the 
will of either party.163 However, § 2-309(3) “requires that reasonable 
notification be received by the [non-terminating] party.”164 In other 
words, the UCC allows parties to terminate at any point in the 
relationship for any reason, but requires the terminating party to 
                                                                                                                     
 157. The problem of how courts select particular gap fillers and set background default 
rules is the subject of a large body of literature. See generally 6 PETER LINZER, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 26.4[A], at 430–41 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010) (summarizing key contract 
theories). I will discuss some of these ideas briefly, infra Section IV.A. 
 158. See U.C.C. § 2-309(2) (2012) (“If the contract provides for successive performances 
but is indefinite in duration, it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be 
terminated at any time by either party.”). 
 159. See, e.g., id. § 2-309(3) (“Termination of a contract by one party except on the 
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other 
party . . . .”). 
 160. See id. § 2-305(1) (“The parties if they so intend may conclude a contract for sale 
even if the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for 
delivery . . . .”). 
 161. See id. § 2-309(1) (“The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a 
contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”). 
 162. See, e.g., id. § 2-306(1). The pertinent portion of the UCC provides: 
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the 
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may 
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to 
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or 
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or 
demanded. 
Id. 
 163. Id. § 2-309(2). 
 164. Id. § 2-309(3). 
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mitigate the harm to the other side by giving advance warning of the 
loss. 
Case law in this area illustrates how a notice requirement 
comfortably coexists with the principle of at-will termination. In Pharo 
Distributing v. Stahl,165 the parties had worked together for several 
years pursuant to an oral distributorship agreement when the defendant 
advised the plaintiff that it had purchased its own distributorship and 
that the contract would end six days later.166 The agreement did not 
contemplate a fixed duration, and the court presumed that the defendant 
had the right to terminate at any time.167 Notwithstanding, it permitted 
the subdistributor to claim damages.168 While the loss occasioned by the 
termination of the contract was not itself compensable, the court 
explained, the losses owing to the failure to give sufficient advance 
warning were.169 The failure to notify deprived the terminated party of 
“an opportunity to make appropriate arrangement[s],” such as finding a 
replacement supplier, unloading inventory, and making workforce 
adjustments.170  
Outside the UCC context, where common law applies, the default 
rule regarding notice is less explicit. However, the dominant approach, 
to the extent it can be disentangled from the employment law cases,171 
appears consistent with the UCC requirement of reasonable advance 
warning of termination.172 Thus, courts have frequently implied a 
common law reasonable notice term to non-UCC distributorship 
contracts.173 In California Wine Ass’n v. Wisconsin Liquor, for instance, 
                                                                                                                     
 165.  782 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). 
 166. Id. at 636.  
 167. Id. at 638. 
 168. Id. at 639. 
 169. Id. at 638 (“It is not the termination of an at-will contract that constitutes the breach; 
the right to terminate is inherent in the nature of the contract. . . . Rather, it is the failure to give 
reasonable notice before termination that constitutes breach.”). 
 170. Id. at 638. 
 171. The misunderstanding of employment at will has muddied the waters of general 
contract law in this context. Occasionally, courts have felt compelled to find indefinite, 
nonemployment contracts terminable at will without notice based on analogy to employment at 
will. See, e.g., Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, Inc., 15 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936); 
infra Section IV.A. Other courts have made a point to distinguish contrary employment cases in 
implying a reasonable notice requirement in nonemployment cases. See, e.g., J. C. Millett Co. v. 
Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (finding cases involving 
indefinite employment contracts “not controlling” in a pre-UCC distributorship contract 
termination dispute because the latter involved both professional services and sales of goods). 
 172.  See Teitelbaum v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 520 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (1988) (noting that 
UCC § 2-309 “codif[ies] common law principles that existed before the adoption of the Uniform 
Commercial Code”). 
 173. See, e.g., Cal. Wine Ass’n v. Wis. Liquor Co. of Oshkosh, 121 N.W.2d 308, 315–17 
(Wis. 1963) (attaching a reasonable notice requirement to an implied contract for exclusive 
liquor distributorship); Aronowicz v. Nalley’s Inc., 30 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a wine and brandy producer 
breached its exclusive distributorship contract by appointing a dual 
distributor without advance notice to the original distributor.174 The 
court held that in the face of contractual silence, “either party may 
terminate [the contract] at pleasure by giving reasonable notice . . . of 
his intention,” and upheld the trial court’s conclusion that sixty days’ 
notice would have been reasonable under the circumstances. 175  
The same can be said, albeit with somewhat less consistency, of 
other types of indefinite agreements. Louisiana, owing to its civil law 
history, offers an easy illustration. That state’s general code of civil 
obligations, Article 2024, explicitly provides that a “contract of 
unspecified duration” may be terminated at will by either party “by 
giving notice, reasonable in time and form.”176 This rule has been 
applied to personal and small business relationships, some of which 
resemble employment relationships. In Caston v. Woman’s Hospital 
Foundation,177 for instance, the plaintiff was a photographer who 
received permission from the chairman of the defendant–hospital’s 
board of directors to photograph all infants born in the hospital in 
exchange for thirty percent of his sales proceeds.178 Within days of 
setting up in the ward and beginning to photograph, the head of the 
pediatric department asked him to remove his equipment and the 
hospital terminated the arrangement shortly after.179 In the 
photographer’s subsequent suit for breach, the Louisiana Court of 
Appeals, relying on a case involving a radio advertising contract, held 
that the plaintiff’s contract with the hospital was “one terminable upon 
the giving of reasonable notice.”180 The court went on to conclude, 
without any factual explanation, that “six months[’] notice would have 
been reasonable” and awarded the photographer the amount he would 
have made during a six-month period.181  
  
                                                                                                                     
1972) (applying a reasonable notice requirement to an oral meat distributorship contract); cf. 
Boland Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2010) 
(finding a material question of fact whether a pet shop supply distributor had expended 
significant sums or substantially arranged its business such that the manufacturer could not 
terminate its nonexclusive contract without reasonable notice).  
 174.  121 N.W.2d 308, 317 (Wis. 1963) 
 175.  Id. at 316. The court affirmed the trial court’s award to the distributor of its 
prospective margin on sales for the sixty-day period following breach of the exclusive 
arrangement. Id. at 318. 
 176. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013). 
 177. 262 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App. 1972). 
 178. Id. at 63. 
 179. Id. at 64. 
 180. Id. at 65 (quoting Daily States Pub. Co v. Uhalt, 126 So. 228, 232 (1930)). 
 181. Id. 
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B.  Reasonable Notice as a Good Faith Duty  
The preceding analysis offers one possible foundation for a default 
rule requiring reasonable notice of employment termination consistent 
with mainstream contract law. However, that is as far as it goes. By 
definition, default rules (and contract gap fillers more generally) apply 
only in the event that parties fail to directly address a particular issue in 
their contract. Were a comparable rule adopted in the employment 
context, employers could reinstitute the current “no notice” system by 
insisting that their employees sign written agreements to that effect.182  
Under the UCC, however, the ability to alter default terms must be 
understood in relationship to broader contractual obligations of good 
faith. As the comment to § 2-309 explains, the reasonable notice default 
recognizes that “the application of principles of good faith and sound 
commercial practice normally call for such notification . . . as will give 
the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement.”183 
Since parties have only limited ability to contract out of good faith, their 
ability to avoid reasonable notice obligations is similarly constrained. 
Indeed, § 2-309 states that an agreement limiting or dispensing with 
notice is unenforceable “if its operation would be unconscionable.”184 
This language could be interpreted to disallow immediate termination 
based on extreme hardship to the losing party, notwithstanding a 
contract provision purporting to grant that right. 
For a reasonable notice rule to provide a modicum of protection to 
workers, it is important to similarly moor the doctrinal arguments in 
favor of such an approach to deeper components of contractual 
obligation within the employment relationship. As in the UCC context, 
the universally implied contractual duty of good faith can provide that 
anchor. Good faith is an obligation inherent in every contract, including, 
according to most courts, employment contracts.185 Its purpose is to 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See generally Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 66–67 (discussing this 
risk); Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment 
Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 174 (2006) (expressing skepticism about 
a waivable notice right, observing that “[t]he reality . . . is that employees will agree to just 
about anything an employer wants. Whether this is due to employee desperation, inequality of 
bargaining power, signaling concerns, or lack of information, permitting employers and 
employees to bargain around the mandatory notice requirement would likely make it 
worthless”). 
 183. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (2012). 
 184. See id. § 2-309(3). Section 1-302(b) specifies that when the UCC provides for an 
action “to be taken within a reasonable time,” parties may fix a particular timeframe that is not 
“manifestly unreasonable.” Id. § 1-302(b). 
 185. See id. § 1-304; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 (2009) (“Each party to an employment contract, including 
at-will employment, owes a non-waivable duty of good faith and fair dealing to each other 
party.”). For an example of the application of the implied duty of good faith in the employment 
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limit unbridled use of discretion. Its effect is to preclude behavior that 
otherwise would be permitted under a strict reading of the parties’ 
express contract. 
Two well-developed theoretical approaches to good faith have 
framed the contemporary understanding of the scope of the duty within 
the mainstream contracts literature: Professor Robert Summers’s 
“excluder” approach186 and Professor Steven Burton’s “forgone benefit 
approach.”187 The excluder approach embraces a broad notion of good 
faith, incapable of specific definition, that prohibits a variety of 
behaviors that may occur during performance—evasion and delay, 
willful underperformance, obstructing performance, and similar 
conduct.188 In contrast, the foregone benefit approach finds a breach of 
the duty only where a party abuses contractually conferred discretion to 
recapture opportunities sacrificed at contract formation.189 Under such 
an approach, the implied duty applies principally to situations in which 
a party attempts to withhold or obstruct the flow of benefits rightfully 
allocated by the contract to his or her opponent. 
As a matter of general contract doctrine, the broad excluder 
approach has won the day. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
explicitly adopts an expansive view of good faith, one that 
“emphasizes . . . consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party” and excludes conduct that “violate[s] community standards of 
decency, fairness or reasonableness.”190 The UCC draws on this 
approach in setting forth its previously described gap filler provisions, 
which amount to specific elaborations on the doctrine. These principles 
all impose an obligation to act “reasonably” and “in good faith” with 
respect to matters on which the contract is vague or silent or permits 
significant latitude to one party.191 Thus, for instance, a party must act 
reasonably and in good faith in setting an open quantity term tied to its 
                                                                                                                     
context, see Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). As will 
be discussed, however, the contours of the duty are limited in the employment context. See infra 
Section IV.B. 
 186. See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207 (1968) [hereinafter 
Summers, Good Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition 
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21, 825–30 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, 
General Duty]. 
 187. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in 
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1980). 
 188. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 186, at 204. 
 189. See Burton, supra note 187, at 387–88. For an excellent summary of these two 
theories, see Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach 
to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1033–49 (2003). 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 191. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(2) (2012) (“A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer 
means a price to be fixed in good faith.”). 
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output, production requirements, or other fluctuating benchmarks.192 In 
this way the doctrine ensures that parties abide by an implicit code of 
business ethics during the life of their agreement. 
While good faith serves largely to moderate party performance and 
preserve contractual relationships, § 2-309 makes clear that it also 
resonates at the point of termination, particularly in the context of long-
term contracts.193 As the court in Pharo puts it, it is an obligation that is 
grounded in “fairness and equity” and designed to grant the losing party 
time to “‘get[] his house in order’ to proceed in absence of the former 
relationship.”194 
C.  Reasonable Notice as Consideration 
The duty of good faith offers a well-grounded doctrinal basis for 
implying a reasonable notice obligation, and one that is more robust 
than a mere default rule. Understanding reasonable notice as an aspect 
of good faith ties that obligation to a larger and broader implied duty 
that may not be fully waived. That said, contract law is unclear as to the 
degree to which a party can contract around good faith by expressly 
permitting that which the duty would otherwise preclude.195 Under the 
UCC, unconscionability serves as an overall limit on contracting 
practices and is specifically mentioned with respect to waivers of notice 
of termination.196 For this reason, this Article contends, infra, that the 
unconscionability doctrine should be understood to void such waivers, 
at least in the employment context. At this juncture it is fair to note, 
however, that unconscionability, particularly in the case of sophisticated 
commercial transactions, is an extremely high standard. A true 
mandatory obligation—one that may not be waived by the parties—
                                                                                                                     
 192. See id. § 2-306(1). 
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the 
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may 
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to 
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or 
otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or 
demanded. 
Id. 
 193. See id. § 2-309 cmt. 8. The same relationship has been recognized by courts applying 
the common law. See, e.g., Misco, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(“Reasonable notice of termination flows from and must be determined in accordance with the 
standards of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.”). 
 194. Pharo Distrib. Co. v. Stahl, 782 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). 
 195. See, e.g., Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App. 4th 798, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (reviewing competing decisions on the relationship between the duty of good faith and 
express reservations of contractual discretion). 
 196. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3). 
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must therefore rely on a different doctrinal theory. 
The doctrine of consideration can do this work. A clear backstop to 
the enforceability of clauses that implicate the duty of good faith is the 
point at which the contract would be so discretionary as to make it 
illusory on one or both sides.197 While the notion of mutuality of 
obligation has long been discredited, at a minimum both parties must 
have made a promise or engaged in a solicited performance in order for 
a contract to exist.198 Where parties do not have this modicum of 
consideration, their promises are said to be illusory.199 
The effect of labeling a contract illusory is to declare it nonbinding, 
and indeed one judicial approach to illusory contracts is to refuse 
enforcement. However, courts have at times inferred or implied an 
obligation on the part of one or both parties to make the contract 
enforceable if there is an intent to be bound. The classic example is 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,200 in which Lady Duff-Gordon, a 
fashion designer, awarded Wood an exclusive license to market her 
creations.201 Wood, however, made no promises in the contract other 
than to pay Lady Duff-Gordon half the profits if her creations sold.202 
Rather than declare the contract unenforceable, then-Judge Cardozo, 
writing on behalf of the New York Court of Appeals, implied an 
obligation on Wood’s part to use “reasonable efforts to bring profits and 
revenues into existence.”203 
While implying reasonable (or good faith) efforts is perhaps the 
dominant judicial response to such omissions, implying a reasonable 
notice obligation is another way to save a contract that would otherwise 
be lacking consideration. Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States,204 a case involving government purchase of trap rock, illustrates 
this approach.205 The plaintiff was a quarry who won four bids to supply 
the defendant’s requirements of different sizes of rock for an airport 
construction project.206 The contracts were government-drafted forms 
containing no delivery terms, which included the following language: 
                                                                                                                     
 197.  See Third Story Music, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 808 (“[C]ourts are not at liberty to imply a 
covenant directly at odds with a contract’s express grant of discretionary power except in those 
relatively rare instances when reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties’ clear 
intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement.”). 
 198. See 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 6.1, at 204 (rev. ed. 1995). 
 199. See id. at 207. 
 200. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 201. Id. at 214. 
 202. See id.  
 203. Id. at 215. 
 204. 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 205. Id. at 644. 
 206. Id. at 642–43. 
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“Cancellation by the Procurement Division may be effected at any 
time.”207 The facts giving rise to the parties’ dispute are not reported, 
but the defendant allegedly refused to “request or accept delivery” and 
the issue, as framed by the court was “whether [the defendant had] 
made any promise that has been broken” in light of the broad 
cancellation clause in the contracts.208  
The Second Circuit found that it had. The court concluded that, 
despite what the contracts said, the cancellation clause could not be read 
to grant the government the power to terminate at any time without 
warning.209 Such an interpretation would have been unreasonable, as it 
would have allowed the government to request a delivery and then 
refuse to accept it.210 Moreover, by giving one party absolute discretion 
as to whether to perform, such a reading would have “ma[d]e nugatory 
the entire contract.”211 Rather, the court held that the clause should be 
understood to require the government to accept and pay for the rock 
unless and until it provided “notice of cancellation [to the plaintiff] 
within a reasonable time.”212 The court explained:  
[I]f it be assumed that the United States was acting in good 
faith in accepting the plaintiff’s bid[, t]he words should be 
so construed as to support the contract and not render 
illusory the promises of both parties. . . . [T]he agreement 
obligated the defendant to give delivery instructions or 
notice of cancellation within a reasonable time after the 
date of its “acceptance.” This constituted consideration for 
the plaintiff’s promise to deliver in accordance with 
delivery instructions, and made the agreement a valid 
contract.213 
Such a reading, the court recognized, still gave the government a 
significant advantage in the contracting relationship, allowing it to 
preserve its option not to perform at all subject only to the notice 
requirement.214 That said, this obligation was “a sufficient consideration 
to support the contract.”215 
Sylvan stands for the proposition that a pure at-will contract—one 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 643. 
 208. Id. at 642–44. 
 209. Id. at 644–45. 
 210. Id. at 644 (“[The government’s] ‘acceptance’ [of the plaintiff’s bids] should be 
interpreted as a reasonable business man would have understood it. Surely it would not have 
been understood thus: ‘We accept your offer and bind you to your promise to deliver, but we do 
not promise either to take the rock or pay the price.’”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 645. 
 215. Id.  
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that is at will in both the substantive and procedural sense—is not a 
contract at all, although the parties may so intend. In such cases, 
implying an obligation to provide advance notice of termination is one 
way to preserve the contract while respecting the clear intent of the 
drafting party to retain broad discretion to terminate for any or no 
reason. 
IV.  CLAIMING CONTRACT LAW FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The previous Part demonstrated that contract law, using a variety of 
theories, ordinarily imputes an obligation to provide reasonable notice 
of termination in the case of indefinite contracts otherwise terminable at 
will. The question then is whether and why employment law might 
deviate from these rules of general applicability. If anything, there 
appears to be even stronger arguments in favor of advance notice of 
termination in the employment context, particularly where the employer 
initiates the termination. Unlike business entities, most workers are 
unable to diversify their investments across multiple contracts and 
generally lack the liquidity necessary to withstand the loss of such an 
important relationship. Advance warning is therefore necessary as a 
policy matter to give the worker time to find replacement employment 
and avoid a sudden disruption in income.216  
This Part examines the use of the previously described contract 
doctrines and theories—the use of reasonable gap fillers, the implied 
duty of good faith, and the doctrine of consideration—in the 
employment context. In contrast to how these concepts are deployed in 
other contractual settings, courts examining employment relationships 
generally do not imply or impose reasonable notice obligations on the 
parties. In fact, they often do not consider these contractual principles as 
part of the governing law. Rather, courts analyze employment 
relationships exclusively through the lens of employment at will, often 
treating the relationship as somehow less than contractual owing to the 
parties’ freedom to terminate. This Part critiques this deviant treatment 
of employment contracts, arguing that courts should follow the same 
notice rules applied to other contracting parties and demonstrating how 
this can be accomplished consistent with employment at will.  
A.  Reasonable Notice as the “Other” Employment Law Default 
In interpreting employment contracts, courts do not use the 
terminology of gap filling, but that is in fact what they do. The power to 
terminate at will is a default term that courts apply in the face of party 
                                                                                                                     
 216. I have explored such considerations extensively in other works. See, e.g., Arnow-
Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8 passim; Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8 
passim. 
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silence as to contract duration, just as they do in the case of other 
indefinite agreements. But while courts interpreting nonemployment 
contracts will also supply a reasonable notice term, courts treat 
employment at will as both a comprehensive and exclusive 
presumption. Courts seem unable to conceive of an employment 
relationship being terminable at any time for any reason, while 
simultaneously being subject to an advance notice requirement. The 
latter obligation is deemed antithetical to employment at will, and 
employment at will is itself seen as antithetical to contract.  
This disconnect is clearest in the case law of Louisiana where, as 
previously noted, a general rule requiring reasonable notice to terminate 
an indefinite contract has been codified.217 Some courts have asserted 
that this provision applies equally to employment relationships.218 
Others have declined to apply the rule to employment at will, though 
they are at pains to explain why. The analysis in Finkle v. Majik 
Market,219 a case involving the termination of a store manager, is 
telling.220 The plaintiff alleged breach of promises of training and 
promotion and the failure to provide notice of termination.221 Regarding 
the latter claim, the court quoted the reasonable notice provision of 
Article 2024 and acknowledged its applicability to “any type of 
contract,” including employment.222 It went on however to qualify this 
statement, adding that “[w]here there is no specific contract between 
[the parties], the employee is at-will and may be terminated . . . without 
the notice requirement.”223 The court did not explain what it meant by a 
“specific” contract, but concluded that the plaintiff did not have one:  
In this case, defendant has provided ample evidence to 
show that the relationship between it and plaintiff was 
simple, at-will employment. The affidavits of the company 
personnel state that plaintiff was not hired under a contract 
for an indefinite or definite term. Further, the employment 
application, signed by plaintiff, specifically states that he is 
                                                                                                                     
 217. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013). 
 218. See, e.g., Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1988) 
(asserting in employment termination case that “[a] contract for an indefinite period is 
terminable at the will of either party upon giving reasonable notice”); 6 EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West, updated Apr. 2014) (“Under the Louisiana Civil 
Code[] . . . oral contracts for employment of indefinite duration are terminable at any time at the 
will of either party upon reasonable notice.”), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4. 
 219. 628 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 220. See id. at 261–62. 
 221. Id. at 261. 
 222. See id. at 261–62. 
 223. Id. at 262; see also LOUISIANA PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12:7 (2013–2014) 
(“Although Civil Code art. 2024 requires notice ‘reasonable in time and form’ prior to 
termination, at-will employment contracts generally require no notice of termination.”). 
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not being offered a position with a contract of 
employment.224 
The reasoning here is opaque, but it appears that the court 
misapprehends the basic notion of contract, conflating the presence of 
express terms with the existence of an enforceable agreement. The court 
seems to think that absent an explicit statement as to duration (whether 
specific or indefinite) there is no contract between the parties. If that 
were true, there would be no need for Article 2024. “[S]imple, at-will 
employment” is a contract for an indefinite term—an agreement to 
exchange labor for remuneration albeit for an unspecified time.225 Thus, 
while the court claims to base its conclusion on a technical application 
of contract law, there appears to be no doctrinal reason for the 
distinction in treatment. 
Admittedly, the common law rule with respect to notice of 
termination is not uncontested. Some courts have rejected the idea even 
outside the employment context.226 However, that may owe more to the 
pervasiveness of the strict interpretation of employment at will than to 
any uncertainty as to how “mainstream” contract principles would 
otherwise play out. A pre-UCC case for the sale of milk in New York is 
illustrative. In Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, an ice cream company agreed 
to buy its requirements of milk and cream from the defendant supplier 
                                                                                                                     
 224. Finkle, 628 So. 2d at 262. 
 225. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what kind of employment contract would be subject to 
Article 2024 if not the one in Finkle. Had the parties agreed to a fixed term, they would not have 
had a “contract of unspecified duration.” It is possible that the court had in mind a written 
agreement containing a provision that the duration of employment was “indefinite,” but 
distinctions based on the form of the agreement (oral versus written, implied versus express) are 
anathema to contracts. Moreover, it is likely that the plaintiff signed a statement to the same 
effect. According to the court, the plaintiff’s job application stated that he was not “being 
offered a position with a contract of employment.” Id. Such language frequently accompanies 
boilerplate acknowledgements of “at-will” status that employees are asked to sign upon 
applying for or commencing employment. I have described this trend in several earlier articles. 
See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, 
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-
Richman, Rise of Delayed Term] (discussing this practice); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap 
Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard 
Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap 
Contracts and Worker Mobility] (same).  
 226. See, e.g., City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) 
(concluding in credit card cancellation dispute that “[a]s a rule there is no requirement of prior 
notice for termination by the issuer”); Cronk v. Vogt’s Ice Cream, Inc., 15 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (concluding that buyer was not obligated to provide advance notice of 
termination of indefinite requirements contract); Simon Bros. Co., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 
83 Wis. 2d 701, 710 (1978) (concluding that supplier–brewer was not liable to distributor for 
termination of an indefinite contract without notice). 
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for an unspecified period of time.227 The relationship continued for 
approximately nineteen months, at which point the defendant stopped 
buying from the plaintiff.228 The court found no breach in the 
defendant–buyer’s cessation of performance, noting the general rule 
applicable to “agency and employment” contracts that, absent a specific 
duration, a contract is ordinarily terminable at will.229 It went on to 
conclude that, similarly, there was no obligation on the part of the 
defendant–buyer to provide any advance notice of its decision to 
terminate, again drawing on employment law:  
No notice is required in this state to terminate employment 
contracts at will, and the logic for the distinction claimed 
[between employment contracts and non-employment 
contracts] is not apparent. Significantly enough, other 
jurisdictions in which notice is said to be necessary, treat 
all agreements of a continuing nature alike in that 
respect.230 
The court did not cite any case law directly supporting the proposition 
that employment termination can be effected without notice, and it 
dismissed as “loose statements” language in several older New York 
decisions to the contrary.231 Oddly, in support of its assertion that a 
universal rule should govern all contracts, it cited cases from other 
jurisdictions applying a reasonable notice rule.232 Thus, the court 
appears to have followed its reasoning to precisely the wrong 
conclusion. Rather than arrest an unjustified divergence between 
employment and contract law, it elevated an arguably aberrational 
reading of the law of termination in the employment context to the level 
of a universal principle of contracts.233  
                                                                                                                     
 227. 15 N.Y.S.2d at 652. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 654. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. at 654–55 (citing Hess v. Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co., 221 N.W. 194, 196–
97 (Iowa 1928), Bastian v. Marienville Glass Co., 126 A. 798, 799 (Pa. 1924), and City of 
Milwaukee v. City of West Allis, 258 N.W. 851, 852 (Wis. 1935)).  
 233. Another context in which courts have rejected a reasonable notice rule is consumer 
contracts with credit card companies. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Exp. Co., 743 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 156 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967). This distinction 
may be explained by the fact that courts treat such contracts as unilateral. See, e.g., City Stores 
Co., 156 S.E.2d at 824. Employment has historically been viewed as a unilateral contract as 
well, but as I will discuss, infra, this is a mischaracterization. See infra Section IV.C. 
Regardless, the more contemporary credit card cases (such as those involving a unilateral 
change in terms by the credit card company, such as the adoption of an arbitration policy), 
generally involve notice to the cardholder, a practice presumably adopted by issuers as a risk 
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The one thing Cronk did correctly was identify the operative 
question—whether there is a reason to treat employment differently 
from other indefinite relationships. As the court suggests, contract law 
has long proceeded under the assumption that a universal set of rules 
and principles applies to all voluntary agreements.234 To the extent 
courts (and contract theorists) have deviated from this assumption, they 
have been motivated at least in part by a desire to achieve more just 
results, suitable to particular contexts.235 Yet such considerations would 
suggest that employees are more, not less, in need of a reasonable notice 
default than other contracting parties. Business entities are well 
positioned to negotiate express contractual provisions protecting 
themselves in anticipation of termination. They are also more likely to 
know and take account of background rules in the process.236  
In this way, a reasonable notice rule is consistent with a variety of 
theories as to how courts should create and apply contract default rules. 
One of the most prominent accounts proposes the adoption of “penalty 
defaults” that force the party with superior information to reveal its 
contractual preference to the less informed.237 A reasonable notice 
                                                                                                                     
management strategy. E.g., Providian Nat’l Bank v. Screws, 894 So. 2d 625, 627–28 (Ala. 
2003). 
 234. Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915, 
916 (2012) (describing the predominance during the last thirty years of “unification theories” of 
contracts which “present[] a single justificatory principle as the core around which the entire law 
of contract should be understood”). 
 235. Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 82–85 
(2009) (articulating three critiques of the notion of a “General Contract Law,” including the 
claim that it yields unjust results in cases that deviate from an “idealized vision of contracting 
parties”). 
 236. Workers’ limited understanding of the employment at-will default has been both 
documented empirically and much discussed by workplace law scholars. See, e.g., Guy 
Davidov, In Defence of (Efficiently Administered) ‘Just Cause’ Dismissal Laws, 23 INT’L J. 
COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 117, 122 (2007) (pointing out that “employees tend to believe that 
the law provides more job security for them than it actually does”); Cynthia L. Estlund, How 
Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9–10 
(2002) (citing studies showing that “most employees believe that they enjoy something like ‘just 
cause’ protection even in the absence of any express contractual protection”); Pauline T. Kim, 
Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in 
an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (demonstrating through survey data that 
workers believe “that they have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they 
in fact have under an at-will contract”); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring 
the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 479–80 (hypothesizing 
that employees overestimate their rights because they “confuse law and norms” and thereby 
wrongly think “that the law prohibits what fairness forbids,” particularly with regard to 
discharge); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 119–20 
(2002) (contending that workers “have a false and exaggerated understanding of their legal 
rights”). 
 237. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). 
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default would have this effect, prodding the employer to express its 
preference for a “no notice” term in writing and preventing the 
employer from reaping the benefit of a favorable background rule 
without paying for it.238 The rule is also consistent with more relational 
accounts of default rules such as those that apply basic notions of 
fairness or seek to account for the norms of the relationship.239 Finally, 
a reasonable notice rule can be justified as a “conventionalist default 
rule,” one that reflects the common assumptions of laypeople, which 
would presumably include the adage that termination of employment 
requires the proverbial two weeks’ notice.240 
A full account of the theory of default rules is beyond the scope of 
this Article.241 The point, however, is that mainstream contract law 
generally presumes a reasonable notice default, and there is no 
theoretical obstacle to extending that rule to employment relationships. 
To the contrary, the practical and theoretical justifications for a 
reasonable notice rule are greater in the context of employment than in 
commercial relationships. It makes little sense to grant a business entity 
on the losing side of a failed contract a period of continued profits while 
denying an individual worker any advance warning or recourse against 
his or her employer. 
B.  Procedural Good Faith Consistent with Employment At Will 
Employment law has similarly veered from the basic contract 
understanding of the duty of good faith. Although both the UCC and the 
common law treat the duty of good faith as an inherent feature of every 
contract, some courts have refused to recognize it in the employment 
context.242 Those that have recognized the duty have adopted the narrow 
“foregone benefit” definition of the duty rather that the more widely 
accepted “excluder” definition.243 The only factual context in which 
good faith claims by employees have enjoyed a modicum of success has 
been where the plaintiff’s termination results in the deprivation of a 
                                                                                                                     
 238. A similar argument has been made with in support of replacing employment at will 
with a just cause default. See Sunstein, supra note 236, at 121. 
 239. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 43, 54–56 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, and 
Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 19, 27–28 (1993).  
 240. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 
3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421, 432 (1993). 
 241. For an excellent summary of some of the seminal papers in this area, see 6 PETER 
LINZER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.4[A] (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010). 
 242. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) (finding 
the implication of a duty of good faith “incongruous” with the employer’s “unfettered right to 
terminate the [plaintiff’s] employment at any time”). 
 243. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
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promised benefit.244 Thus, courts have recognized a limited cause of 
action for deferred payments, such as commissions or bonuses, or the 
value of a vested benefit where the termination was motivated by a 
desire to avoid payment.245  
Even in those cases that fit this factual paradigm, courts have not 
permitted recovery absent a demonstration of actual bad faith in the 
form of an intent to deprive the worker of the lost benefit, a standard not 
applicable in commercial law relationships.246 In addition, courts have 
refused even in successful cases to award damages for lost employment 
generally, as in lost wages.247  
This rigid treatment of the duty of good faith reflects a vaulted and 
doctrinally problematic understanding of employment at will. The 
conclusion that at-will employment somehow trumps other implied 
duties relies on the misapplication of a rule of interpretation that 
pertains to express contract language. Contract law permits parties to 
limit the scope of the good faith duty by expressly granting or reserving 
areas of contractual discretion in their agreement.248 But most 
employees do not have written contracts. Where there is no written 
agreement between the parties, employment at will is an implied term 
just like good faith—a provision supplied by law.249 Courts rejecting 
employee good faith based on the “conflict” between the implied duty 
and employment at will err in elevating what is merely a default 
principle to the status of an explicit reservation of discretion.  
More importantly, the inherent inconsistency between the implied 
duty of good faith and such a written reservation of discretion arises 
only when good faith is equated with a substantive limitation on the 
power to terminate. Employment plaintiffs bringing implied duty claims 
tend to frame their cases around allegations that their employer had a 
                                                                                                                     
 244. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). 
 245. See id. at 1253. 
 246. See id. at 1255–56 (holding that a cause of action for breach of duty of good faith is 
available where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the termination was for the purpose of 
depriving him of earned commissions). 
 247. For this reason, some scholars have eschewed the doctrine altogether in favor of 
relying on other common law theories in seeking to expand workers’ termination rights. See, 
e.g., Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 MO. L. REV. 1233, 1233–34 (1992). 
 248. See VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (“The general rule [regarding the implied duty of good faith] is plainly subject to the 
exception that the parties may, by express provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in 
the very acts and conduct which would otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. . . . [I]f defendants were given the right to do what they did by the 
express provisions of the contract there can be no breach.”); supra Section III.B. 
 249. In fact, good faith is the more robust of the two implied terms—a mandatory and 
universally implied term that, per U.C.C. § 1-302 (2012), may not be waived, rather than an 
ordinary default term that parties are free to replace.  
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bad faith reason for terminating them—what may be described as a 
“substantive good faith” claim.250 This type of claim falls in neatly with 
the broader common law wrongful discharge jurisprudence, which has 
recognized various paths to overcoming the at-will presumption in 
situations involving wrongful or arbitrary employer motivation.251 Yet 
such inquiries into why the employer acted are in direct tension with the 
most entrenched component of employment at-will—the substantive 
discretion rule. For this reason, it may be more fitting—and more useful 
to employee litigants—to think of the duty of good faith as a procedural 
obligation, one that requires parties to act fairly in carrying out 
discretionary decisions that are otherwise immune from substantive 
review.  
Although no court has taken this “procedural good faith” approach to 
notice of employment termination, there are a handful of cases 
involving other types of employment disputes that suggest judicial 
amenability to such a development. One example derives from the 
unlikely context of employee drug testing. In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska 
Drilling, Inc.,252 the Alaska Supreme Court held that as a matter of good 
faith, an employer had to provide advance notice to its workers of its 
decision to institute a drug testing protocol.253 There, the worker was 
suspended for testing positive for drugs and terminated when he failed 
to appear for a retest.254 The court found nothing against public policy 
in the termination, concluding that the employer’s interest in safety 
outweighed the employee’s interest in privacy.255 It held, however, that 
the initial suspension violated the duty of good faith because the 
employer had failed to provide the worker advance notice of its drug 
testing policy.256 The duty of good faith, the court explained, not only 
has substantive content but also requires that the employer act in “a 
manner which a reasonable person would regard as fair.”257  
The recognition of promissory estoppel claims by neophyte 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983) 
(plaintiff accountant asserted that his employer had wrongfully terminated him for flagging 
accounting improprieties in accordance with his job duties). 
 251. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1655, 1657–62 (1996) (describing the development of “bad motive” exceptions to 
employment at will through antiretaliation statutes and public policy jurisprudence); Ann C. 
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Coherent National 
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1491–93 (1996) (same). 
 252. 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992) [Luedtke II]. 
 253. Id. at 1225–26. 
 254. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. [Luedtke I], 768 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Alaska 
1989). 
 255.  Id. at 1133–37. 
 256. Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1225–26. 
 257. Id. at 1224. 
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employees offers another example. Courts have held that employees 
terminated immediately upon or prior to starting a new job have a 
limited cause of action where they made investments or incurred losses 
based on the employer’s offer. In the seminal case, Grouse v. Group 
Health Plan, Inc.,258 a pharmacist resigned from his current 
employment and turned down a job in reliance on the defendant’s offer 
of employment, only to be fired prior to starting his new position.259 
The court recognized a claim under the Restatement of Contracts § 90, 
treating the plaintiff’s foregone job opportunities as a form of 
detrimental reliance.260 Its rationale, however, was informed by good 
faith notions. Attempting to delineate the scope of the cause of action, 
the court distinguished the plaintiff’s situation from that of ordinary at-
will employees, noting that under the facts presented the employee “had 
a right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to 
perform . . . once he was on the job.”261 The result is equivalent to a 
minimum period of employment, much like what would be required 
under a reasonable notice rule.262  
Of course, analogies to drug testing and promissory estoppel cases 
are attenuated, but they lend some support to a theory that has much to 
commend itself as a policy matter. Indeed, it would be surprising for a 
court to dismiss entirely the possibility of a procedural good faith claim 
given the underlying rational for reasonable notice under the UCC and 
nonemployment contract law. Almost invariably the employee will have 
made a significant financial and personal investment in the job and will 
need time to wind up the relationship and find an alternative “buyer” for 
his or her services.  
                                                                                                                     
 258. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
 259. Id. at 115–16. 
 260. See id.  
 261. Id. at 116. In many ways the implied duty of good faith provides a better rationale for 
these cases than promissory estoppel, which poses a more direct conflict with substantive 
employment at will. While disappointed employees can generally show reliance in retracted 
offer cases, they are often at pains to meet the other elements of the promissory estoppel claim.  
Courts struggle to explain how it is reasonable for an employee to rely on a promise of at-will 
employment or why it is unjust for the employee to suffer the consequence of such reliance. See, 
e.g., May v. Harris Mgmt. Corp., 928 So. 2d 140, 147 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (noting, in rejecting 
Grouse, that it is “patently unreasonable” for an employee to rely on an offer of at-will 
employment). In such cases, promissory estoppel is not substituting for the absence of an 
enforceable contract or even for a failed contract, but is arguably enlisted to replace the contract 
to which the parties ostensibly agreed.  
 262. A case involving a retracted offer arising under Florida’s reasonable notice rule 
reveals the overlap between the two claims. In Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., the plaintiff 
was a resident of England who relocated to Florida for a job with the defendant. 490 So. 2d 993 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Upon arriving in Florida, however, he learned that he would not be 
employed. The court found actionable the defendant’s failure to provide reasonable notice of its 
retraction and awarded the plaintiff damages for the expenses incurred in relocating to the 
United States in reliance on the offer. Id. at 996. 
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In fact, the current state of the duty of good faith in employment 
relationships is puzzling. One would expect the law of good faith to 
resonate most strongly in those contexts, such as employment, that 
involve relationships of dependence and the risks associated with 
nondiversifiable investments. Instead, commercial parties in arms’ 
length transactions appear to have greater good faith obligations to one 
another than companies do in dealing with workers. Recognizing a 
procedural good faith claim entitling employees to reasonable notice of 
termination would be a convenient and doctrinally honest vehicle for 
mitigating the harsh effects of employment at will without defeating the 
substantive discretion aspect of the rule. 
C.  Reasonable Notice and the Bilateral Employment Contract 
Finally, courts are highly idiosyncratic in their application of 
contract formation principles to employment relationships. Whereas 
contract law generally favors finding a mutually enforceable 
relationship, courts invariably treat employment as a unilateral contract, 
one in which the parties have no reciprocal obligations to each other.263  
This peculiar treatment of employment contracts conflates the ability 
to terminate at will with the absence of a binding obligation. Up until 
the mid-twentieth century, courts frequently cited lack of mutuality as a 
reason to refuse the enforcement of employer promises of long-term 
employment in situations where the employee was not similarly 
bound.264 Such thinking mistook mutuality of obligation for an 
equivalency requirement and violated the bedrock principle that courts 
do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.265  
The majority of courts now recognize the error in that rationale, and 
mutuality no longer figures prominently in employment contract 
analysis. However, courts have not provided a more cogent theory of 
consideration that explains how and to what extent parties to an 
employment relationship are contractually obligated to one another 
                                                                                                                     
 263. PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 198, § 6.2, at 213; Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral 
Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 551–52 (1983). 
 264. Even courts disclaiming the applicability of mutuality of obligation often proceeded to 
refuse enforcement based on a lack of equivalence in the parties’ ability to enforce the 
agreement. Thus, some courts have insisted that the employee show “additional consideration” 
to support an employer’s promise of job security beyond simple agreement to accept the job or 
turn down another offer. See, e.g., Hanson v. Cent. Show Printing Co., 130 N.W.2d 654, 658 
(Iowa 1964) (asserting that “the real basis for the majority rule” requiring additional 
consideration is that “there is in fact no binding contract . . . when the employee has not agreed 
to it; that is, when he is free to abandon it at any time”). 
 265. See PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 198, § 6.1; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND 
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.10 (5th ed. 2003); id. § 4.12, at 205 (“The doctrine is not one of 
mutuality of obligation but rather one of mutuality of consideration. . . . The concept of 
‘mutuality of obligation’ has been thoroughly discredited.”). 
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given that one or both remain free to terminate at will.266 Treating 
employment as a unilateral contract sidesteps the issue. Under this 
construction, a job offer (or any terms of employment) is viewed as an 
offer for a unilateral contract that the employee may accept by 
performance.267 If he or she accepts, the employer is obligated to pay 
for the work performed, but neither has an obligation to continue. By 
definition, only one side (the employer) has made any promise at all, 
and that promise is a conditional one, contingent on the employee’s 
choice to perform. 
But unilateral contract analysis is an awkward vehicle for theorizing 
the employment relationship.268 To begin, unilateral contract analysis 
has an idiosyncratic and increasingly limited role within general 
contract theory. The Second Restatement of Contracts famously rejected 
the terminology of “unilateral/bilateral” and moved away from 
distinctions that link contract formation to the manner of acceptance—
either promise or performance.269 According to the Restatement, 
offerees are free to accept in any reasonable manner, unless the offeror 
or the circumstances clearly specify.270 This relegates unilateral contract 
analysis to a narrow universe of transactions in which the promisor does 
not want to be bound until the performance is fully completed and the 
                                                                                                                     
 266.  See Lord, supra note 22, at 714 (recognizing that “[b]ecause the traditional rule allows 
either party to an at-will relationship to put an end to it at any time, a promise by either the 
employer or the employee to continue an existing at-will relationship is by its nature illusory” 
and faulting courts for failing to treat promises premised on continued employment 
accordingly). 
 267. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000) (describing a company’s 
management security policy as an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of 
which was accepted by employees via their continued employment); Torosyan v. Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 96 (Conn. 1995) (“To determine the contents of any 
particular implied contract of employment, the factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship 
must be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank 
v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983) (describing employer’s personnel manual as a 
“unilateral offer” that the employee accepted through “continued performance of his duties 
despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 
1985) (describing an employer’s personnel manual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a 
unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being 
their continued work when they have no obligation to continue”); PERILLO & BENDER, supra 
note 198, § 6.2; Bryce Yoder, How Reasonable is “Reasonable”? The Search for a Satisfactory 
Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1523 (2008). 
 268. Professors Hazel Beh and Jeffrey Stempel have argued against the characterization of 
insurance contracts as unilateral for some of the same reasons. See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract 
Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 86, 89 (2010). 
 269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 53–54 (1981). 
 270. See id. at § 50, cmt. a (“Offers commonly invite acceptance in any reasonable 
manner . . . . In case of doubt, the offeree may choose to accept either by promising or by 
rendering the requested performance.”). 
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promisee is unable to promise complete performance. 271 These include 
offers of rewards or other promises that might be fairly characterized as 
a challenge or dare, such as paying someone to walk across the 
Brooklyn Bridge.272  
Employment does not fit this paradigm. As a practical matter, 
employment is often offered with the expectation of a promissory 
acceptance. The employer offers the job and the employee accepts with 
the expectation that performance will begin at a subsequent time, which 
may or may not be proximate to the time of acceptance. In the interim, 
both parties are bound and wish to be bound so that the employee can 
confidently suspend his or her job search and the employer conclude its 
recruitment effort.  
More importantly, such employment cannot be characterized as a 
discrete transaction. No doubt some types of work lend themselves to 
spot assignments—a contractor, for instance, may offer a laborer $100 
to tear down a fence. In such cases it is possible to describe the 
relationship as unilateral, though the better understanding is probably 
that the laborer’s commencement of the work indicates a promise to 
finish the job.273 The presumption of employment at will, however, 
applies, by definition, to contracts of “indefinite” duration. The parties 
commence performance with the idea that the work will be ongoing 
unless and until one of them wishes to end the relationship for a 
particular reason (whether good or bad), and with the understanding that 
the performance itself will develop and change over time.274 Such 
situations are antithetical to unilateral contract theory, which is 
premised on the idea that the promisor’s obligation (usually simple 
payment) will be triggered by the promissee’s total completion of a 
discrete, identifiable action.275 
Finally, characterizing employment as a unilateral contract does not 
accord with party expectations and their explicit and implicit 
                                                                                                                     
 271. See Pettit, supra note 263, at 560–65 (describing the typical application of unilateral 
contract theory prior to its contemporary expansion into employment law). 
 272. This classic example is generally attributed to Professor I. Maurice Wormser’s article, 
The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916). See Beh & 
Stempel, supra note 268, at 93. 
 273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54, cmt. b. Certainly the builder is not 
“indifferent” as to whether the fence is fully removed. 
 274. Cf. Beh & Stemple, supra note 268, at 112–13 (rejecting the idea that the insured’s 
premium payment is a “complete performance” and suggesting that it is the first step in a long-
term, relational contract involving continued payment for continued performance). 
 275. Modern contract law has itself retreated from the idea that the promissor is not bound 
until performance is fully complete. Under § 45 of the Restatement, once performance has 
begun, a promisor is prohibited from revoking his or her promise for a reasonable amount of 
time sufficient to allow the promisee to complete performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 45 (1981). This doctrine, which is rarely invoked in the employment context, 
further evidences the lack of fit between employment and unilateral contract theory. 
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commitments. The hallmark of a unilateral contract is that only one side 
is bound. Employment can be unilateral only if we accept the premise 
that only the employer has made a promise (to pay for performance 
rendered), and that the employee has committed to nothing. But this is 
patently not the case. Employees make numerous explicit and implicit 
promises when they accept a job—to show up to work (the first day and 
thereafter), to be on time and ready to work, to perform diligently and 
make reasonable efforts with respect to the work itself, to follow 
supervisor instructions and employer policies, to refrain from 
misconduct and other destructive behaviors, and in general to act in the 
interest of the employer and in furtherance of its business. While many 
such promises are implied rather than explicit, contemporary employers 
frequently go further and solicit formal written promises from 
workers—promises to refrain from postemployment competition, 
promises to maintain confidentiality of employer information, promises 
to abide by a dispute resolution policy—with every intention that they 
are to contractually bind the worker in the future.276 That the employee 
has the ability to terminate the relationship does not change the reality 
that promises have been made on both sides.277  
The idea that employment at will is a bilateral contract terminable 
upon reasonable notice has not been explored in the termination 
context.278 However, common law developments in the area of 
handbook modification lend support to the analysis. Although the law in 
this area remains unsettled, an emerging majority rule suggests that an 
employer may alter its policies at will so long as it provides advance 
notice of the change.279 While courts adopting this view persist in 
                                                                                                                     
 276. I have discussed this trend in a number of earlier articles, as have others. See, e.g., 
Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 225, at 638–39; Arnow-Richman, 
Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility, supra note 225, at 963–66; Cynthia L. Estlund, 
Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a 
Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380–82 (2006). 
 277. See Beh & Stempel, supra note 268, at 113 (rejecting the idea that a policyholder’s 
ability to cancel renders an insurance contract unilateral, noting that “the same might be said of 
magazine subscriptions, record clubs, yard service, pool service, or countless other contractual 
arrangements that are generally regarded as bilateral”). 
 278. A Florida case involving the enforcement of a covenant not to compete comes close. 
In Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court 
described the parties’ fixed-term contract, which contained a clause permitting the employer to 
terminate at will upon written notice, as “a bilateral contract containing mutual executory 
promises.” The court found that the noncompete was not void for lack of mutuality, concluding 
that the employer’s promise to provide written notice supplied the requisite consideration. Id. 
 279. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000); Bankey v. Storer Broad. 
Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04(a) 
(Preliminary Draft No. 8 2011). For a good summary of the state of the law on this issue, see W. 
David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with Public 
Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2003). 
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calling the parties’ contract unilateral, their approach better accords 
with bilateral contract analysis.280 Modern contract law prohibits the 
promisor in a unilateral agreement from withdrawing or altering the 
terms of its offer once the promisee has begun performance.281 
However, in a bilateral, at-will relationship, parties who are already free 
to terminate on reasonable notice could similarly alter terms on 
reasonable notice, the notice serving as notice of termination under the 
old terms and the new terms serving as a new offer. In this way, the 
bilateral contract analysis proposed here lends a much-needed doctrinal 
underpinning for the emerging handbook modification rule.282  
There is much more that can be said both about the limitations of 
unilateral contract analysis in theorizing employment and about the 
merits of bilateral contract analysis as the alternative. For purposes of 
this Article, however, the point is merely that employment looks much 
more like a long-term commercial relationship than daring someone to 
climb a flagpole or offering a reward for the return of a lost cat. The 
better understanding of the employment relationship is that it is a 
bilateral contract much like a long-term commercial contract in which 
both parties are committed—the buyer to buy and the seller to sell—
even if they are free to terminate at will. In both contexts, where the 
parties retain absolute discretion to terminate at will, reasonable notice 
supplies the requisite consideration for what might otherwise be 
                                                                                                                     
 280. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 77; Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 116. 
 281. Indeed, the very fact that employers often seek to modify their policies, and thus the 
terms of the employment relationship, indicates that the relationship is bilateral rather than 
unilateral. In a unilateral contract situation, the performance is acceptance that both binds and 
completes the deal; there is no opportunity for a subsequent modification. As Professors Beh 
and Stempel explain in their critique of unilateral contract theory in the insurance context:  
[A]s a theoretical matter, unilateral amendment of the terms should have no 
rule in unilateral contracts because, by definition, there has been no contract 
formed or the contract is formed and fully executed at the same moment. 
Logically, then, the mere presence of unilateral amendment of contract terms 
suggests that the contract in question is not unilateral. 
Beh and Stempel, supra note 268, at 119. 
 282. Interestingly, the Restatement of Employment supplies no doctrinal explanation for its 
adoption of the majority rule on handbook modification. Rather it suggests that employers’ right 
to modify handbooks unilaterally upon notice to the workforce is analogous to the type of notice 
provided by administrative agencies in advance of changes in regulations. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b. This rationale, and the Restatement’s choice to 
adopt a unilateral modification approach, has been subject to significant scholarly critique. See 
Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of 
Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 132 
(2009) (noting that “no jurisdiction has adopted administrative agency estoppel as the 
underlying rationale for enforcing employer policy statements” and questioning the analogy 
between agency guidance and an employer promise which “directly establishes the substantive 
rules governing that relationship”). 
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considered an illusory undertaking.283  
V.  THE LIMITS OF COMMON LAW REASONABLE NOTICE 
The previous Part argued that basic contract law principles of 
general application suggest that every employment at-will contract 
should be understood to include an implied reasonable notice term. It is 
a separate question whether such an approach would in fact benefit 
employees. If employers are able to easily contract around the rule, or if 
the rule imposes significant reciprocal obligations, employees may be 
no better off (and possibly worse off) than under a strong at-will rule. 
Additionally, a reasonable notice rule is likely to pose administrative 
challenges. Adopting a reasonableness standard could spur litigation 
and introduce costs and uncertainty into the current wrongful discharge 
system.  
This Part does not aim to fully vet all of the possible economic and 
administrative implications of a reasonable notice system.284 To the 
extent that sophisticated parties to indefinite commercial contracts have 
long operated under this rule, despite its limitations, the burden ought to 
be on those who wish to except workers from the general scheme of 
contract law to justify the differential treatment. This Part, however, 
will touch on some of the key practical questions about how a common 
law reasonable notice system might operate, focusing in particular on 
the ways that employers might seek to avoid the administrative burdens 
                                                                                                                     
 283.  For an excellent discussion of the illusory nature of employment at will and the 
difficulties posed by consideration analysis, see generally Lord, supra note 22, at 726–30, 746–
50, 764–66 (demonstrating how courts have mistakenly applied the doctrine of consideration in 
enforcing promises not to compete by at-will employees). Professor Lord’s article focuses on 
the particular context of covenants not to compete rather than at-will termination generally, and 
he offers a different solution to the illusory contract problem than that which is proposed here. 
Professor Lord advocates that courts either abandon the doctrine of consideration in favor of a 
totality of the circumstances test or adopt the “Texas Position” under which noncompetes are 
enforceable against at-will employees only if the employer provides actual consideration that is 
not contingent on continued employment. Id. at 717, 766. Professor Lord’s work implicitly 
recognizes, however, that an implied reasonable notice period would similarly supply the 
requisite consideration for an enforceable agreement insofar as it effectively grants the 
employee a period of guaranteed employment for whatever time period is reasonable. See id. at 
750–53 (suggesting that a promise of at-will employment that is understood to include a good 
faith opportunity for the employee to perform would constitute consideration for a noncompete 
and that the immediate termination of the employee would be a failure of consideration possibly 
amounting to a breach).  
 284. I have discussed several of these issues at greater length in previous work. See 
generally Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, at 320–22 (exploring possible cost 
savings effects of a reasonable notice statute that could partially offset increased employer 
payments to workers during the required notice period); Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra 
note 8, at 61–64, 69–71 (considering the possible impact of a reasonable notice rule on 
employee wages and the demand for labor).  
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of such a rule through drafting and what that might mean for employees. 
Ultimately, it concludes that legislative codification may be the best 
way to achieve a predictable and effective reasonable notice system. In 
the meantime, common law notice can serve as a modest, if 
inconsistent, source of protection for at-will employees.  
A.  Reasonableness and the Burdens of a Flexible Standard 
Perhaps the most important and most troublesome question 
concerning a common law reasonable notice rule is what constitutes 
reasonable notice. The amount of notice required under such a rule will 
determine how valuable the right is to workers, who stand to be its 
principal beneficiaries, as well as the cost to be borne by employers, 
who will have to pay additional wages to workers who might otherwise 
have been fired immediately. The manner in which reasonable notice is 
assessed will also determine the extent to which the rule burdens the 
judicial system. Because reasonableness is a fluid and fact-specific 
inquiry, one can expect litigation testing its contours.285 
Concerns about the administerability of an open-ended 
reasonableness test clearly underlie the expressed resistance to a 
reasonable notice rule by those courts that have grappled with and 
rejected the approach. The previously described retreat from Virginia’s 
common law notice rule is an example. Speculating on the implications 
of a reasonable notice rule, the federal district court in American Home 
presaged a world in which this “new” cause of action “would permit 
every discharged employee to sue the employer,” and because of the 
fact-sensitive nature of the reasonableness inquiry, “every case filed 
would have to be decided by the finder of fact.”286 The result, warned 
the court in rejecting reasonable notice, would be the “eviscerat[ion]” of 
employment at will.287 
Given the limited extent to which reasonable notice has been 
explored in the employment law jurisprudence, such concerns are not 
unfounded. Employment cases requiring notice of at-will termination 
are scarce, and most do not elaborate on the rule. Several courts simply 
conclude that the notice provided by the employer was or was not 
                                                                                                                     
 285. See Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, at 53 (recognizing that American 
litigiousness combined with the absence of any domestic custom regarding reasonable notice 
may make adoption of a context-dependent reasonable notice of employment termination rule 
unworkable); Libenson, supra note 182, at 165–66 (rejecting Canada’s individual assessment of 
reasonableness in proposing an American notice of employment termination rule). 
 286. Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (E.D. 
Va. 1997). 
 287. Id. at *9. 
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reasonable.288 Others direct the claim to the fact finder without 
providing guidance.289 Those that do allude to the meaning of 
reasonableness are inconsistent and do not rely on any articulated policy 
or theory. The key Florida case on this subject bases reasonableness on 
the practices of the industry, perhaps out of fealty to historical cases 
enforcing customary notice.290 Still another decision asserts that 
reasonableness “depend[s] on the cause of the employee’s discharge.”291 
However, precedent and experience from outside the employment 
context, and outside of the United States, suggest that fears about the 
erosion of employment at will are overstated. In contrast to employment 
law, commercial law offers an explicit and consistent standard for 
reasonable notice: the amount of time necessary for the terminated party 
to replace the lost contract or otherwise mitigate the resulting loss.292 
This might include finding a replacement supplier, unloading inventory, 
and making workforce adjustments—whatever the terminated party 
must do “to proceed in absence of the former relationship.”293  
                                                                                                                     
 288. See, e.g., Settle v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. 91-0028-CIV-ORl-18, 1992 WL 
210986, at *5 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (concluding without analysis that four months was reasonable); 
Malver v. Sheffield Indus., Inc., 462 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding 
without analysis that one week was reasonable); Stubbs v. Vestry of St. John’s Church, 53 A. 
917, 919 (Md. 1903) (concluding without analysis that two months was reasonable); Slade v. 
Cent. Fid. Bank, 12 Va. Cir. 291, 291 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (concluding that “no notice to an 
employee of twenty-four years is prima facie unreasonable”). 
 289. See, e.g., Torres v. Consol. Bank, N.A., 653 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). Other cases offer a mixed bag of possible standards. See, e.g., Rehman v. ECC Int’l 
Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (referring to the length 
of the pay period and evidence of custom, and concluding that reasonableness “requires the trier 
of fact to consider all the circumstances of Plaintiff’s employment”). At least one court asserts 
that no guidance (beyond reasonableness) is required, rejecting any requirement for expert 
testimony regarding customs in the industry. See Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir. 
163, 1988 WL 619159, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) (concluding that the jury was competent to 
reach its own conclusion on reasonableness of notice based on “common sense and collective 
human experience”). 
 290. Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that the 
defendant–employer owed two weeks’ pay based on “testimony of the parties indicat[ing] that 
two weeks’ notice prior to termination is customary in the business”); see also Rehman, 1993 
WL 85758, at *1 (denying summary judgment based on “genuine issues of fact regarding 
customs in this industry . . . tending to show that no extended pay is available”). But cf. 
Braunfeld, 1988 WL 619159, at *3 (rejecting the argument that testimony regarding industry 
practices was necessary to determine reasonable notice).  
 291. Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 451, 1997 WL 33623611, at *3 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1997). 
 292. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) cmt. 8 (2012) (calling for “such notification . . . as will give the 
other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement”); Pharo Distrib. Co. v. Stahl, 782 
S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he obvious object of the reasonable notice 
requirement is to afford the party losing the contract an opportunity to make appropriate 
arrangement in lieu thereof.”). 
 293. Pharo Distrib., 782 S.W.2d at 638.  
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The viability of importing this standard to the employment context is 
evidenced by Canadian employment law, which follows a substantially 
similar rule. Under the Canadian common law notice rule, reasonable 
notice of termination is based on the totality of circumstances, with an 
emphasis on the employee’s ability to find replacement work.294 Courts 
consider such factors as the worker’s age, duration of employment, and 
the value of the worker’s skills.295 The length of the notice period (or 
pay provided in lieu of notice) generally increases with the employee’s 
age and length of service, factors that are likely to correlate inversely 
with the degree of flexibility in the employee’s skills and the 
transferability of his or her work experience.296 Notice periods are also 
longer where the manner of termination reduces the worker’s chances of 
reemployment.297 At the same time, courts consider factors that bear on 
the overall fairness of the notice period with reference to the 
relationship, including such things as the reason for the termination and 
the financial situation of the employer.298 For this reason, no notice is 
required in Canada where the employee is dismissed for misconduct, 
notwithstanding the hardship of finding reemployment,299 and notice 
may be reduced where the employer faces economic exigencies.300  
Notwithstanding its fact-specific nature, an examination of the 
Canadian rule in operation does not bear out the parade of horribles 
envisioned in American Home. Rather, it appears that a developed body 
of case law has yielded adequate guidance to Canadian employers and 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See generally ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311 (“In determining the period of 
reasonable notice, [Canadian] courts have always placed paramount weight on whether or not 
the employee can reasonably be expected to find replacement work, recognizing that employees 
need a financial cushion to support them while they conduct a job search.”); Robert C. Bird & 
Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in Canada and the United States: A 
Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 205, 208 (2004) (“The basic premise 
underlying common law reasonable notice [in Canada] is that the period should approximate the 
period of time that the employee would need to find a new position.”). 
 295. See Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd. (1960), 24 D.L.R. 2d 140, paras. 13–19 (Can. Ont. 
High Ct. J.) (enumerating factors to be considered in determining reasonableness). 
 296. See id.; ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311–17. 
 297. For a time, an award could include punitive amounts based purely on an employer’s 
bad faith conduct. See Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 745–46 
(Can.); Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 213–19 (surveying judicial application of Wallace). 
But the Canadian Supreme Court subsequently clarified that such additional sums are allowable 
only when the employee suffers actual harm or distress as a result of the bad faith treatment and 
when such an injury was in the contemplation of the parties. See Honda Can. Inc. v. Keays, 
2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362, 391–92 (Can.). 
 298. See G. England, Determining Reasonable Notice of Termination at Common Law: The 
Implications of Cronk v. Canadian General Insurance Co., 4 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115, 127–28 
(1996) [hereinafter England, Determining Reasonable Notice]; ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 
312–14; Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 208.  
 299. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 324–43. 
 300. See England, Determining Reasonable Notice, supra note 299, at 127. 
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their attorneys about the appropriate duration of notice in particular 
cases. Litigation over common law notice is the exception rather than 
the rule.301 Indeed, research suggests that American workers, subject 
though they are to a strict employment at-will presumption, are more 
likely to pursue legal claims post-termination than their Canadian 
counterparts.302  
Canadian employment law and American commercial law thus offer 
established standards for reasonable notice. These standards are 
consistent with the limited scope of the implied duty of good faith, 
which can be invoked to limit contractual discretion but not to alter it. 
Reasonable notice is defined with reference to replacement costs, not 
the loss of the relationship itself. The rule’s flexibility ensures that the 
amount of notice is tailored to the particular situation, giving the worker 
adequate lead time while not overcompensating workers whose skills 
are in high demand. It also attempts to balance the business interests of 
the employer by accounting for the employee’s performance record and 
the economic demands on the company.  
While this flexibility is important in gauging the rights of 
employees, it is even more critical in situations where the rule is 
brought to bear on employee-initiated terminations. Any obligation to 
provide notice based on the previously described contract theories 
would necessarily be reciprocal. Implied terms, such as reasonable gap 
fillers and the duty of good faith, apply to all parties, and bilateral 
contract analysis requires the implication of a modicum of consideration 
on both sides of the transaction. This means that employees, as well as 
employers, would be obligated to supply reasonable notice prior to 
exercising the right to terminate at will. Reasonable notice to an 
employer, however, is likely to differ from reasonable notice to an 
employee, particular if the key factor is the ability to replace the loss. 
Employers are generally able to find substitute workers more easily than 
                                                                                                                     
 301. See Bird & Charters, supra note 295, at 209 (“Typically, [a Canadian] employer can 
determine an acceptable continuum of notice prior to termination and provide the employee with 
notice or payment in lieu of notice that is within the acceptable range.”); England, Determining 
Reasonable Notice, supra note 299, at 122 (noting that the majority of wrongful dismissal suits 
are settled in negotiations before trial). A number of practitioners’ resources routinely 
summarize judicial rulings on notice and a number of rubrics and guidelines are used for making 
ex ante assessments. See, e.g., WRONGFUL DISMISSAL DATABASE ONLINE, available at 
http://www.wrongfuldismissaldatabase.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (offering a searchable 
index of Canadian notice cases “designed to provide [attorneys] with a summary of the fair 
severance details of the cases most relevant to [their client’s] situation”). 
 302. See Laura Beth Nielsen, Paying Workers or Paying Lawyers: Employee Termination 
Practices in the United States and Canada, 21 LAW & POL’Y 247, 274 (1999). Of course, it is 
impossible to know for certain whether Canada’s experience with reasonable notice could be 
replicated in the United States. The difference in litigation rates documented in Nielsen’s 
research may owe in part to systemic differences in the country’s legal system (such as the 
lesser availability of jury trials, differences in recoverable damages, etc.) or to broader cultural 
differences.  
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an employee can find new work. At the same time, those factors under 
Canada’s reasonable notice rule that consider the fairness of the notice 
period in light of the parties’ relationship would allow for adjustments 
based on specific circumstances. For instance, general considerations of 
fairness would countenance an immediate quit in situations involving 
serious employer mistreatment. Similarly, reduced notice would be 
appropriate in the case of compelling personal circumstances 
necessitating an employee’s sudden departure. 
B.  The Enforceablity of Express Limitations on Notice Rights 
A second, and perhaps more significant, concern regarding the 
efficacy of a common law notice rule is the degree to which parties can 
contract around their implied notice obligations. A reasonable notice 
system will likely impose some costs on employers, who might be 
forced in particular situations to provide notice where they might 
otherwise have terminated immediately.303 Moreover, the flexibility of a 
reasonableness rule, even with judicial adoption of an articulable 
standard, is likely to create a degree of uncertainty regarding the 
propriety of any particular termination. One would expect some, if not 
many, employers to try to avoid these problems through written 
agreements. The enforceability of such contracts at common law will 
therefore be an important determinant of the value of any judicially 
recognized reasonable notice right. 
1.  “Contracting Out” of Reasonable Notice 
Efforts to control the economic and administrative consequences of a 
reasonable notice rule could take several forms, not all of which will 
necessarily be in derogation of employee rights. One possibility is that 
employers will seek to resolve questions of reasonableness at the point 
of exit through severance and release agreements. In Canada, it is 
standard practice for an employer to provide a lump sum payment in 
fulfillment of its advance notice obligation and obtain a release from 
further liability.304 Although a conventional reading of American 
                                                                                                                     
 303. One might suppose that in such situations the salary paid to the employee, either 
during the notice period or in the form of severance pay, will represent a net loss to the 
employer. In reality, however, there are many ways in which a notice regime might produce cost 
savings to employers. For instance, advance notice may give an employee a funded opportunity 
to find alternate employment, thereby reducing the employer’s unemployment insurance 
premiums, or it may reduce the likelihood that the employee will seek to dispute the 
termination, thereby reducing litigation costs. I have explored the possible cost-savings effects 
of a reasonable notice rule at length elsewhere. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra 
note 8, at 320–22. For purposes of this Article, I will assume that employers will incur at least 
some costs in the context of some terminations. 
 304. Nielsen, supra note 303, at 273. 
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common law does not so require, U.S. employers frequently choose to 
provide severance pay to terminated workers, generally in exchange for 
releases of other types of claims.305 Employers could simply fold notice 
claims into those agreements, which would be enforceable provided the 
requisite contract formalities are met.306  
A more troubling possibility is that employers might seek to limit or 
even eliminate their reasonable notice obligations at the outset of the 
relationship. The preference for express notice provisions likely 
explains, at least in part, the relative dearth of cases disputing the 
reasonableness of notice in indefinite business and commercial 
contracts. Sophisticated parties presumably place a premium on the 
certainty they can achieve by negotiating their termination rights in 
advance, and doing so may not be especially costly if they intend to 
produce a written contract regardless. In the employment context, 
however, advance planning of this variety is likely to take the form of 
standardized, employer-drafted agreements providing that workers will 
receive little or no notice upon termination.307 
                                                                                                                     
 305. See LEE HECHT HARRISON, SEVERANCE & SEPARATION PRACTICES: BENCHMARK 
STUDY 2008–2009 1, 4–5 (2008), available at http://www.lhhitalia.com/it/Documents/LHH_
SevStudy08.pdf. 
 306. Of course, employers seeking simultaneous waivers of age discrimination claims 
would have to go beyond contract formalities to comply with the heightened duties mandated by 
the Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1), (1)(H) (2006) (requiring 
that employee waivers of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims be “knowing and 
voluntary” and obliging employers to provide statistical information enabling employees to 
assess the viability of  possible claims). It is also possible that employers would want to provide 
a severance premium beyond the amount of pay associated with the reasonable notice period in 
order to ensure consideration for waivers of additional claims extracted from the worker, 
although the provision of a lump sum payment in lieu of future wages could arguably serve that 
purpose. 
 307. This risk is not limited to the notice context. I have written elsewhere about 
employers’ use of standard forms to impose covenants not to compete and predispute arbitration 
agreements, as have others. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 225, at 
638–39; Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility, supra note 225, at 963–
66; Estlund, Between Rights and Contract, supra note 225, at 380–82; Daniel Roy, Mandatory 
Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1359–60 (1999); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Private Resolution 
of Public Disputes: Employment, Arbitration, and the Statutory Cause of Action, 32 PACE L. 
REV. 114, 125–27 (2012); Jon H. Sylvester, Validity of Post-Employment Non-Compete 
Covenants in Broadcast News Employment Contracts, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 423, 454 
(1989). That said, it is possible that commentators overstate the likelihood that employers will 
draft around their legal obligations. Large employers who are knowledgeable in the law and 
already maintain an infrastructure for producing and administering form employment 
agreements may be likely to add “no notice” provisions to their documents. But less 
sophisticated employers with informal personnel practices may not. In addition, all employers 
will have to weigh the reputational effects, if any, of insisting on a complete relinquishment of 
this right. Ultimately, the question of how employers respond to adverse law is, of course, an 
empirical one that is contextually dependent. For purposes of this section, I will assume that a 
subset of employers will seek to obtain a complete waiver of employee notice rights. 
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The effectiveness of an employer-drafted provision eliminating or 
constraining employee notice rights depends in part on the contractual 
theory through which a reasonable notice rule is adopted. As previously 
discussed, the various doctrinal pathways through which courts might 
imply reasonable notice are not equal in terms of the strength of the 
resulting rule. A straight gap filler analysis yields a simple default that 
by definition can be altered though drafting, while a good faith analysis 
results in a more robust rule, though one that is in theory still 
subservient to the express terms of the parties’ contract.308 The implied 
consideration theory therefore offers the only doctrinal hook for voiding 
some forms of employer opt out. In the face of a “no notice” provision, 
a court applying the illusory contract theory might find it necessary to 
“save” the employment contract by implying some form of reasonable 
obligation notwithstanding the “no notice” language.  
On the other hand, the argument for such a move in the face of a 
limited notice contract is far less sound. A promise to provide even the 
most modest amount of notice would presumably supply the requisite 
consideration for a binding contract. In the case of a contract specifying 
a truly nominal amount of consideration—one hour, one minute, or 
even one second—there might be a basis for treating the consideration 
as nominal, consistent with the idea that sham consideration does not 
represent a true bargained-for exchange.309 Courts, however, are well 
versed in the familiar interdiction against evaluating the adequacy of 
consideration and may be unwilling to take this route.310 Thus, while the 
                                                                                                                     
 308. See supra Part III.  
 309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. d (1981) (“Disparity in 
value . . . sometimes indicates that the purported consideration was not in fact bargained for but 
was a mere formality or pretense. Such a sham or ‘nominal’ consideration does not satisfy the 
requirement of § 71.”); Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t has 
been recognized that where no bargain actually occurred as evidenced by nominal or sham 
consideration and the surrounding circumstances, the purported consideration is not in fact 
consideration.”). 
 310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c (“Valuation is left to private 
action in part because the parties are thought to be better able than others to evaluate the 
circumstances of particular transactions. . . . Ordinarily, therefore, courts do not inquire into the 
adequacy of consideration.”); id. § 71 cmt. c (“Ordinarily . . . courts do not inquire into the 
adequacy of consideration, particularly where one or both of the values exchanged are difficult 
to measure.”); Sirius LC v. Erickson, 244 P.3d 224, 229 (Idaho 2010) (stating that the Court 
would not inquire into the adequacy of consideration “so long as some consideration is 
provided”); Tanton v. Grochow, 707 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to 
inquire into the adequacy of consideration and deferring to the judgment of the parties where the 
consideration was “of an indeterminate value . . . agreed upon by the parties”); Horace Mann 
Ins. Co. v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 344 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va. 1986) (“[P]arties to a contract are at 
liberty to determine their own valuations, and courts generally will not inquire into the adequacy 
of consideration.”). The notion of a written contract requiring negligible notice recalls the 
“minute” contracts frequently imposed on workers during the nineteenth century as a means of 
preventing them from engaging in sudden work stoppages. See Feinman, Employment At Will, 
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contention of this Article is that reasonable notice may not be fully 
waived, litigants must anticipate that many courts will defer to 
employers’ standard clauses on this issue.  
2.  Unconscionability and “No Notice” Provisions 
If employers attempt to contract out of reasonable notice, and if 
courts are willing to defer to such provisions, the enforceability of 
employers’ written terms will turn on the worker’s ability to 
demonstrate a contractual defense such as unconscionability. Generally 
speaking, unconscionability imposes a high bar on those seeking to 
avoid enforcement of express contract terms. A party must show that 
the term in question is substantively unfair in that it is oppressive and 
overreaching, and that the contract was procedurally defective, that is, 
that there was a lack of knowing consent in the bargaining process.311 
Most courts require a party to establish both prongs of the defense,312 
and although unconscionability is frequently asserted, it is rarely 
successful.313 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 17, at 121–22; Jacoby, supra note 28, at 98. It does not appear that such contracts 
were ever challenged from a consideration perspective, but courts did assume them to be 
binding. 
 311. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 194 (Cal. 2013) (“[T]he 
doctrine of unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element . . . .”); Williams 
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has 
generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”); 7 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (rev. ed. 2002); Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 
(1967) (defining unconscionability as defects in the bargaining process, or “procedural 
unconscionability,” and defects in the resulting bargain, or “substantive unconscionability”). 
 312. See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and 
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 155 (2005) (noting that courts have been reluctant to 
find unconscionability where only procedural unconscionability is present); Steven Goldberg, 
Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The Assessment of Risk in a Contract to Build 
Nuclear Reactors, 58 WASH. L. REV. 343, 349 (1983) (“Courts generally will not void a clause 
unless they find both substantive unconscionability—a bargain that appears dramatically 
uneven—and procedural unconscionability—a defect in how a bargain is reached.”); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203, 1256–57 (2003) (“[M]ost courts have held that the doctrine may be invoked only on 
a finding of both imperfections in the bargaining process, known as ‘procedural 
unconscionability,’ and an unfairly one-sided term, referred to as ‘substantive 
unconscionability.’”). 
 313. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2006) (finding that the 
unconscionability defense succeeded in only 37.8% of sampled cases); see also James R. 
Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 
28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 119 (2003) (stating that a party only needs to show that the other party 
was aware of a term to overcome an unconscionability defense, and that unconscionability was 
intended to impose “a hurdle higher than unfairness”); Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing 
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Even so, there is reason to expect that at least some courts will be 
receptive to an unconscionability challenge in cases involving a 
unilaterally drafted provision that eliminates or deeply constrains the 
employee’s right to notice. Such an analysis is specifically 
contemplated under the UCC. Section 2-309 constrains parties’ ability 
to contract out of the default reasonable notice term by providing that 
“an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation 
would be unconscionable.”314 This reference to unconscionablity in the 
text of a provision setting forth a particular contract term is notable 
given that the UCC already establishes unconscionability as a universal 
defense applicable to any agreement. Section 2-302 provides that a 
court may refuse to enforce a contract or any part of a contract if “as a 
matter of law [it] finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made.”315 Thus, there is no need 
to restate the availability of the unconscionability defense in § 2-309, 
unless the drafters intended such clauses to receive special scrutiny. 
Indeed, § 2-309 appears to impose a lower threshold for 
unconscionability than § 2-302, referring to written provisions that are 
unconscionable in “operation.”316 Whereas the standard 
unconscionability inquiry examines the situation of the parties at the 
time of contracting, § 2-309 looks at the consequences of the clause to 
the adversely affected party.317 The operative question is whether the 
failure to provide reasonable notice consistent with the parties’ express 
terms created an “unconscionable state of affairs.”318 This may be the 
case even where an objective assessment of the parties’ situation at the 
time of drafting indicates that a party was adequately compensated for 
assuming the risk of an immediate termination.  
                                                                                                                     
Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 75 (2006) (observing that courts 
have become “increasingly rigid in their application of a two-prong unconscionability test”); 
Rebecca Schonberg, Introducing “Abusive”: A New and Improved Standard for Consumer 
Protection, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1415 (2012) (“[C]ourts have generally applied the 
unconscionability doctrine narrowly.”). 
 314. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (2012). 
 315. U.C.C. § 2-302. 
 316. U.C.C. § 2-309(3). 
 317. See generally PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.6. The only other section of Article 2 that 
specifically refers to the availability of an unconscionability defense is § 2-719 regarding 
liquidated damages provisions. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (“Consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential 
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.”). There too, the drafters of the 
UCC appear to sanction a lesser showing than that typically required to establish an 
unconscionability defense. See generally PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.5. 
 318. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8; see PERILLO, supra note 312, § 29.6 (“Subsection [2-309](3) 
addresses the conscionability of a termination. It does not address the conscionability of a 
termination clause.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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There is almost no reported case law examining the applicability of 
UCC § 2-309 in the context of a written waiver of the reasonable notice 
obligation. However, a federal district court case involving a patent 
dispute provides an example of why such clauses might be considered 
unconscionable in a business relationship, and a fortiori, in an 
employment situation. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,319 chip-maker 
Intel was found to have breached its contract with Intergraph, a 
manufacturer of computer workstations, by terminating the relationship 
despite a provision in the parties agreement, which the court interpreted 
as permitting termination without notice.320 The court based its decision 
on the investment Intergraph had made in configuring its machines to 
accept Intel chips, a production choice that had involved years of 
research and development time.321 The combination of Integraph’s sunk 
costs and Intel’s market share meant that it was virtually impossible for 
Integraph to stay in business without continued access to Intel products 
and the proprietary information necessary to work with them.322 Thus, 
allowing Intel to exercise the termination clause without significant 
advance warning to Integraph would have created an unconscionable 
state of affairs.323 
Not every court would necessarily take this approach with respect to 
notice, at least not in the commercial context. Indeed, the district court’s 
opinion in Integraph was ultimately vacated by the Federal Circuit, 
which heard the case on appeal pursuant to its patent law jurisdiction.324 
In a decision based almost entirely on antitrust law, the court rejected 
the district court’s conclusion that Intel’s behavior had been in restraint 
of trade and took issue with its authority to compel continued 
performance of the contract.325 In its brief consideration of contract 
principles, the circuit court characterized unconscionability as an 
“extraordinary remedy,” designed to protect consumers and other 
“uneducated” parties, with limited relevance to the commercial 
                                                                                                                     
 319. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 320. Id. at 1287. The contract provided for termination “at any time without cause upon 
notice to the other party,” but did not explicitly state that termination could occur “without 
notice.” Id. at 1266. However, the court subjected this language to the unconscionability test 
applicable to “agreement[s] dispensing with notification” under § 2-309, implicitly interpreting 
the parties’ contract as permitting termination without notice. Id. at 1285. 
 321. See id. at 1261–62. 
 322. See id. at 1263. 
 323. The court also noted that in addition to its powerful position in the industry generally, 
Intel had unilaterally drafted the parties’ agreements. See id. at 1271 (“These NDAs are 
documents drafted by Intel and presented to Intergraph and other customers on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. Intel simply dictates the terms under which it provides its products . . . .”). 
 324. Integraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 325. Id. at 1354–55. 
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context.326 It made no mention of UCC § 2-309’s explicit reference to 
unconscionability as a backstop to parties’ ability to limit notice, or 
even § 2-302, the UCC’s umbrella unconscionability provision that 
governs all aspects of commercial contracts. Indeed, the court did not 
mention the UCC at all.  
Whatever the merits of the Federal Circuit’s ultimate conclusions 
regarding Intel, the district court’s analysis provides some indication of 
how courts might respond to a “no notice” provision in an employment 
contract. Employment is a paradigmatic example of an unequal 
bargaining relationship in which one party has limited choice with 
regard to the terms of the relationship. That is generally not enough for 
unconscionability: employees can choose not to deal on terms they find 
objectionable by refusing employment that includes a “no notice” 
provision. But UCC § 2-309 pushes the relevant inquiry to the moment 
in time at which termination is effected. The question is not the 
constraints that existed at the time of contract formation, but rather the 
effect of the contract provision, a nuance that the Federal Circuit failed 
to consider. In the context of employment, a “no notice” provision, 
which would allow a company to immediately cut off an individual 
worker’s only stream of income without any advance warning or 
continuing obligations, presents a stark example of what the UCC 
would likely conceive of as “an unconscionable state of affairs.”327  
                                                                                                                     
 326. Id. at 1365 (quoting Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So. 2d 713, 717 (Ala. 
1989)). 
 327. U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (2012). By way of comparison, Canadian employers have at 
times made efforts to reduce or eliminate notice obligations by contract and have been met with 
limited success. See Etherington, supra note 29, at 461–69 (reviewing Canadian case law 
involving challenges to written waivers of notice). However, in Canada, provincial statutes 
provide for minimum notice periods which may not be waived. See, e.g., Ontario Employment 
Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 5(1) (Can.) (“[N]o employer . . . shall contract out of or waive 
an employment standard and any such contracting out or waiver is void.”), available at 
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_00e41_e.htm#BK7. Where 
waiver is attempted, courts will treat the provision as void and apply the common law 
reasonable notice rule. See Machtinger v. HOJ Indus., [1992] S.C.R. 1001 (Can.); Christensen v. 
Family Counseling Ctr. of Sault Ste. Marie and Dist., [2001] 151 O.A.C. para. 8 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.); MacDonald v. ADGA Sys. Int’l Ltd., [1999)] O.A.C. para. 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Because 
of this statutory overlay, Canadian cases do not present the precise question of the enforceability 
of an absolute waiver of common law notice rights resulting in a termination without notice. 
However, a fair reading appears to be that total waivers of the common law right, to the extent 
that they can be disentangled from statutory waivers, are unenforceable or at least narrowly 
construed. See Marchen v. Dams Ford Lincoln Sales Ltd., [2010] BCCA 29, para. 39 (B.C.C.A.) 
(“[T]he provision [allowing termination without consent] confirms the common law right to 
terminate a non-fixed term contract, but it does not obviate the need to give reasonable notice.”); 
Ceccol v. Ont. Gymnastic Fed’n, [2001] O.A.C. 315, paras. 2, 44–45 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding 
that an employment contract stating that the Employment Standards Act governed certain 
terminations was not clear enough to “successfully rebut[] the common law presumption of 
reasonable notice”). But see MacDonald, [1999] O.A.C. at para. 24 (finding that because a 
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C.  A Legislative Solution? 
The previous sections offer preliminary strategies for addressing two 
potentially problematic implications of a common law reasonable notice 
regime. Whether such strategies prove successful remains to be seen. It 
will take years for courts to develop an understanding of what 
constitutes reasonable notice in particular circumstances, and issues of 
waiver and unconscionability will have to be litigated and tested. At 
best, there will be some period of uncertainty, during which it will be 
difficult for parties to predict how best to handle termination decisions. 
And, of course, there is no guarantee that courts will be willing to 
accept a robust theory of reasonable notice rights. If employers choose 
to use waivers aggressively and courts ultimately prove hostile to 
employee unconscionabiltiy claims, it is possible that the power 
imbalance created and perpetuated by the current employment at-will 
rule will play out to the same effect within a reasonable notice regime.  
Given these concerns, legislation that codifies and clarifies parties’ 
reasonable notice obligations may be desirable. Examples are easy to 
discover. Laws requiring employers to provide advance notice of 
termination (or its equivalent in pay) abound in Europe, where they 
comprise part of the larger scheme of employment protection regulation 
within individual nations.328 Mandatory notice statutes also exist in the 
Canadian provinces and federal jurisdiction, where they operate in 
tandem with that country’s common law reasonable notice rule, 
requiring a base amount of notice or pay that may be supplemented 
under the common law based on the peculiarities of the particular 
case.329  
Adopting a statutory notice law will obviate many of the 
administrative challenges posed by a common law reasonable notice  
rule. The fixed periods contained in such laws will provide clear 
guidance to employers and are unlikely to give rise to additional 
wrongful discharge litigation.330 At the same time, fixed notice periods 
                                                                                                                     
contract provision limiting notice to not less than one month did not violate the statutory 
minimum, the written provision could displace common law reasonable notice). 
 328. See, e.g., Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 86 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/86; BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I, § 622 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p2546. For a summary of 
the notice rights created by some of these laws, see Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 8, 
at 54–57. 
 329. See, e.g., Ontario Employment Standards Act, S.O. 2000, c. 41, § 57 (Can.). See 
generally ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 289–324 (describing the relationship between these 
sources of obligations). 
 330. In fact, such laws may reduce litigation. Workers who receive advance notice (or 
severance pay) may be less likely to invoke wrongful discharge claims as a means of addressing 
the sudden loss of income occasioned by an immediate termination. They may also feel more 
68
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/2
2014] MAINSTREAMING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 1581 
 
are likely in many cases to lead to results similar to what would be 
achieved under a fact-specific reasonableness standard. The statutory 
notice laws of most nations use length of service as the benchmark for 
determining the amount of required notice. This measure is likely to 
reasonably approximate the loss to the employee under the theory that 
long-standing employees have a stronger property interest in their jobs 
or suffer a greater wrong than their more junior counterparts. Length of 
service may also serve as a proxy for employability, given that 
employees who over time gain firm specific skills are likely to be more 
valuable to their current employer than to the general market.331 Thus, 
what statutory periods sacrifice in terms of the close fit between the 
requisite notice and particular factual circumstances may well be worth 
the gain in administerability and certainty of outcome.  
At the same time, a legislative approach would allow policy makers 
to impose additional obligations or constraints to ensure the 
effectiveness of its notice regime. Any legislation requiring 
pretermination notice could also prevent employers from contracting 
out of that obligation, either by making the right to notice nonwaivable 
or by imposing meaningful procedural or substantive limitations on 
such efforts.332 Notice legislation could also clarify the obligations of 
voluntarily separated workers. Under such a statute, the legislature 
could mandate more modest notice periods for departing workers and 
delineate exceptions under which such obligations would be excused. 
Alternatively, the legislature could supersede the common law and 
provide that departing workers have no obligation to provide any notice 
to employers.  
The project of developing and vetting possible statutory proposals is 
one I have pursued elsewhere, and it will not be further considered in 
this Article.333 It should be noted, however, that the recognition of a 
                                                                                                                     
fairly treated and consequently less likely to sue. See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra 
note 8, at 321 (suggesting that some workers may use wrongful discharge litigation as a way “to 
address the legitimate hardship and perceived unfairness of at-will termination”). 
 331. See ENGLAND, supra note 84, at 311 (describing factors examined under the Canadian 
reasonable notice rule, including “age and the degree to which skills and experience are firm 
specific,” which courts consider indicative of “whether or not the employee can reasonably be 
expected to find replacement work”); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating 
Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 13 (1993) (describing the “basic 
human-capital model” under which workers invest in learning the ways of the firm, becoming 
more productive as their employment tenure increases). To the extent years of service correlates 
with age, it also implicitly addresses the possibility that bias will impact the ability of older 
workers to find new work.  
 332. I elaborate on the possible means by which legislators can restrict employers’ ability 
to contract out of a statutory notice obligation in prior articles. See Arnow-Richman, Just 
Notice, supra note 8, at 66–69. 
 333.  See Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause, supra note 8, passim; Arnow-Richman, Just 
Notice, supra note 8, passim. 
69
Arnow-Richman: Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1582 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
common law cause of action may be a necessary first-step toward 
securing support for legislative reform. Ad hoc adoption of a common 
law notice obligation tied to a fact-specific reasonableness standard 
could produce a state of uncertainty sufficient to inspire interest in a 
statutory mandate among employers. Such an alignment between 
management and labor in favor of employee-protective legislation 
occurred briefly during the 1980s in response to judicial innovations in 
the area of wrongful discharge law.334 Fear of a flood of employee-
initiated litigation prompted employers to briefly support compromise 
legislation establishing a just cause termination standard in exchange for 
limited remedies and preemption of other common law claims.335 
Ultimately, such coalitions proved unsuccessful in most states,336 but 
their existence illustrates the potential for statutory reform achieved 
through shared interest and compromise. If the chaos of a common law 
reasonable notice claim inspires a bipartisan move toward a statutory 
mandate, it will have served a valuable purpose.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has exposed a fundamental mistake in employment 
doctrine, as well as a paradox in contract law jurisprudence. 
Contemporary employment law has developed under the assumption 
that at-will parties may terminate their relationship both without reason 
and without notice. This Article has demonstrated that the latter 
component of the rule—the idea that parties enjoy absolute procedural 
as well as substantive discretion to terminate—is neither legally correct 
nor historically supported. An examination of general contract law 
reveals precisely the opposite. In a variety of nonemployment contexts, 
and using a number of different contract theories, courts imply or 
impose on parties to an indefinite relationship a duty to provide 
reasonable notice of termination. Such an obligation serves not only as a 
gap filler in the face of contractual silence, but as a good faith limitation 
                                                                                                                     
 334. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 
WASH. L. REV. 361, 367, 370 (1994) (discussing the development of the Model Employment 
Termination Act, which proposes a just cause dismissal standard coupled with streamlined 
procedures and limited remedies, and which was designed as compromise legislation in 
response to judicial decisions recognizing employee implied contract claims).  
 335. In retrospect it appears that such concerns by employers were unfounded, see Lauren 
B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful 
Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 67 (1992) (describing the degree to which management 
overemphasized the risk of implied contract liability relative to employee success rates in 
bringing such claims), which may explain in part why the model statute was ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
 336. See St. Antoine, supra note 335, at 380–81 (discussing limited prospects for META’s 
enactment). The only state where just cause legislation ultimately succeeded was Montana. See 
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (West 
2013). 
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on parties’ exercise of substantive discretion, one that may not be 
waived without sacrificing the modicum of consideration necessary to 
create a binding relationship. 
In the face of this divergence, this Article lays the groundwork for a 
more unified body of contract law and a more generous system of 
common law protection for workers. The notion of a uniform contract 
law is a contested one; the numerous situations where principles of 
voluntary exchange must operate are arguably too diverse and context-
specific to be mediated by a single set of abstract rules. But deviations, 
where necessary, are best justified as a means of counteracting power 
imbalances by fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the party in the 
weaker bargaining position. Employment-specific contract rules, as they 
currently stand, do precisely the opposite. The result is that workers are 
treated worse than commercial parties dealing at arms’ length in 
sophisticated transactions. 
Ultimately, this Article seeks to leverage contract law to fashion an 
obligation to supply advance notice of employment termination, one 
that, while reciprocal, will inure primarily to the benefit of employees. 
While employees would still be subject to termination at the whim of 
the employer, they would at least receive advance warning and some 
income continuation to ease their transition. The arguments laid out here 
are the first step; it remains for lawyers and judges to do the rest. 
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF STATE NOTICE LAW 
This appendix categorizes each state according to its treatment of 
advance notice of termination in the context of at-will employment.  
States listed as “no notice” states are those in which one or more 
decisions either hold or support the conclusion that parties to at-will 
employment relationships may terminate without notice.  This category 
also includes states in which a state statute supports the inference that 
at-will employment relationships may be terminated without notice. 
States listed as “reasonable notice” states are those in which one or 
more decisions either hold or support the conclusion that parties to at-
will employment relationships must provide advance notice of 
termination. States listed at “open” states are those in which there 
appear to be no cases addressing the issue of notice of termination in at-
will relationships, nor any cases from which a particular notice rule may 
be inferred. States listed as “mixed law” states are those in which there 
are one or more decisions that support the conclusion that employment 
at will may be terminated without notice, as well as one or more 
decisions that support the conclusion that advance notice of termination 
is required. 
 
“No Notice” States (9) 
 
Alabama  
Colorado 
Hawaii  
Montana  
Michigan  
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
 
“Reasonable Notice” States (3) 
 
California 
Florida 
Maryland 
 
“Open” States (30) 
 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
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Connecticut337 
Delaware 
Georgia  
Idaho338 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire  
New Jersey339 
New Mexico 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
West Virginia  
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
                                                                                                                     
 337.  There is a Superior Court case in Connecticut rejecting an at-will employee’s claim 
for negligent inflection of emotional distress in which the court observed that "lack of advance 
warning or written notification is insufficient evidence that an employer acted unreasonably in 
terminating an employee-at-will.” Thompson v. Bridgeport Hosp., 1999 WL 1212310 (Conn. 
Super.). However, the decision, which ruled on defendant’s motion to strike, addressed only the 
plaintiff’s negligence claim and not her contract claims.  In addition, the plaintiff had received 
both advance warning that her department was closing and one month’s oral notice of her date 
of termination. 
 338. There is a State Supreme Court case in Idaho stating that employment at will permits 
termination “without cause at any time, assuming any notice requirements are met.” Thomas v. 
Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 442 P.2d 747, 751 (Idaho 1968). Most likely the court is referring to 
express contractual notice obligations. 
 339. There is one early twentieth century decision in New Jersey that rejects a claim based 
on the failure to provide notice of termination, but while the court refers to the termination as “at 
will” it appears that the employee was terminated pursuant to a satisfaction clause in the 
contract permitting immediate termination upon his unreasonable delay. See Miller v. Atlantic 
City, 74 N.J.L. 345, 347 (N.J. 1907). There appears to be no other articulation of the 
employment at-will rule by a New Jersey state court that refers to the right to terminate without 
notice. 
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“Mixed Law” States (8) 
 
Louisiana340 
Massachusetts341 
Missouri342 
New York 343 
Pennsylvania344 
Tennessee345  
                                                                                                                     
 340. Louisiana’s code provides that indefinite contracts may be terminated at will upon 
reasonable notice. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2024 (2013). Courts and commentators, 
however, have offered different views as to whether this provision of general contract law 
applies to employment relationships. Compare Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 
446 (La. Ct. App. 1988), and 6 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 22:4 (West, 
updated Apr. 2014), available at Westlaw EDC ANAREL § 22:4, with Finkle v. Majik Mkt., 
628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993), Harrison v. CD Consulting, Inc. 2006 WL 
1194749 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.), and LOUISIANA PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT LAW § 12:7 (2013–
14). See generally supra Section II.C. 
 341. There are several contemporary cases in Massachusetts that characterize at-will 
employment as the right to terminate without notice; there is also older case law in the state that 
refers to a “reasonable notice” requirement. Compare Jackson v. Action for Bos. Cmty. Dev., 
Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412–13 (Mass. 1988), with Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187, 187–90 
(1873). 
342. In Missouri, there are at least two twentieth century cases stating that employment 
contracts of indefinite duration are terminable upon “reasonable notice.” See Paisley v. Lucas, 
143 S.W.2d 262, 271 (Mo. 1940); Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407, 415 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1943). However, a turn-of-the-century decision, rejecting a claim by workers 
terminated without notice and blacklisted for union activity, asserts that “in a free country like 
ours every employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer without notice, 
and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer may legally discharge his employ[ee], 
with or without notice, at any time.” Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo. 
1903). 
 343. In New York, there is at least one nineteenth-century case accepting the principle that 
customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker where the custom can be factually 
established. See Hathaway v. Bennett, 6 Seld. 108, 113 (NY 1854). There is also at least one 
contemporary case holding that advance notice of at-will termination is not required, albeit in a 
case involving employer breach of loyalty claims against departing employees. See Town & 
Country House & Home Serv. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 728 (N.Y. 1958). There are several 
other New York cases referring to the ability to terminate without notice in dicta. Horn v. N.Y. 
Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755, 758–59 (N.Y. 2003); Kotick v. Desai, 123 A.D.2d 744, 744–45 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 858, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). 
See generally supra Section II.C. 
 344. In Pennsylvania, there is a nineteenth-century state supreme court case rejecting a 
claim based on failure to provide notice, see Cofin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434; 1864 WL 4617 
(1864); supra Section I.B, as well as a contemporary trial court case reciting as the general rule 
that parties may terminate at will “upon reasonable notice,” see Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D 
& C 599, 601 (1985).   
 345. In Tennessee, there is one case purporting to define employment at will as including 
the right to terminate without notice, and at least one case in which the court “assumes” that 
“reasonable notice” is a prerequisite to terminating an at at-will employee. Compare Lee v. City 
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Texas346 
Virginia347 
                                                                                                                     
of LaVergne, No. M2001-02098-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), 
with Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 346. At least one older Texas case cites the general contract principal that termination must 
occur on “reasonable notice”; however, in the case itself the issue was whether the employee 
had actual knowledge of termination, not advance knowledge. See Island Lake Oil Co. v. 
Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). Other Texas cases refer to termination 
“on notice” and the ability to terminate “by giving notice,” both of which suggest the law 
merely requires actual notice. See, e.g., McKinney v. Smith, 271 S.W. 247, 247–49 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1925). Still, other cases refer to termination with “no notice” and termination on 
“reasonably short notice.” Compare Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) 
(Hecht, J., concurring), with Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App. 
1987).  
 347. Virginia has several cases that apply or refer to a “reasonable notice” requirement, but 
also cases that explicitly reject the theory that there is an independent cause of action for failure 
to provide advance notice. Compare Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 
55 S.E. 551, 552 (Va. 1906), with Perry v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:96CV595, 1997 WL 
109658, at *8–9 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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APPENDIX B: NOTICE OF TERMINATION CASES 
This appendix contains select cases that discuss or refer to notice of 
termination in the context of at-will employment. Cases listed as 
“reasonable notice” cases either hold that reasonable notice of at-will 
termination is required or support such a conclusion by inference or in 
dicta. Those cases listed as “no notice” cases either hold that at-will 
employment may be terminated without notice or support such a 
conclusion by inference or in dicta. “Contemporary cases” are those 
dating from 1960 to the present. “Historical cases” are those decided 
prior to 1960. 
1.  “REASONABLE NOTICE” CASES 
a.  Cases Recognizing or Presuming a Right to Reasonable Notice of 
Termination of At-Will Employment 
i.  Contemporary Cases 
Florida 
 
Rehman v. ECC Int’l Corp., 1993 WL 85758, at *1 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 
(concluding that issues of fact regarding industry custom precluded 
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim based on failure to provide 
reasonable notice or continued pay). 
 
Roebuck & Co., No. 91-0028-Civ-Orl-18, 1992 WL 210986, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that the employer provided four months’ 
advance notice of termination consistent with its obligation to provide 
reasonable notice in rejecting employee’s claim of breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
 
Malver v. Sheffield Industries, Inc., 502 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (upholding trial court’s decision that employer complied 
with reasonable notice obligation by providing employee one-week’s 
severance pay). 
 
Crawford v. David Shapiro & Co., P.A., 490 So. 2d 993, 996–97 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a prospective employee who 
relocated from Britain for a job offer could be awarded damages arising 
from the defendant-accounting firm’s failure to provide reasonable 
notice of termination of the employment offer); cf. Settle v. Sears, 990 
F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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Perri v. Byrd, 436 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding 
that restaurant was required to provide two-week’s notice to terminated 
musicians and awarding damages equaling two-weeks’ salary). 
 
Tennessee 
 
Roberts v. Federal Exp. Corp., 1991 WL 104203, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1991) (presuming that at-will employees are entitled to reasonable 
notice of termination in concluding that maintenance mechanic accused 
of stealing customer property would not have been entitled to notice 
because he was terminated for cause). 
 
Virginia 
 
Studer v. Hurley, 82 Va. Cir. 406, 407 (2011) (“One of the incidents of 
employment at will is the ability of either party to terminate the 
relationship with or without cause at any time, upon giving reasonable 
notice.”). 
 
Rubin v. Maloney, 75 Va. Cir. 452, 453 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2007) (“Virginia 
has long adhered to the common law doctrine of employment ‘at will’ 
where when a term of employment cannot be determined from the 
contract, either party is at liberty to terminate the contract at any time 
for any reason, upon reasonable notice.”). 
 
Tingle v. Chasen’s Bus. Interiors, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 451, at *3 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1997) (permitting plaintiff’s claim based on employer’s failure to 
provide reasonable notice of at-will termination; reasonableness to be 
determined based on the cause for discharge). 
 
Laudenslager v. Loral, 39 Va. Cir. 228, 229, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 140 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (noting that Virginia law requires “each party to an 
employment relationship to give the other reasonable notice of 
termination unless there is an agreement or understanding to the 
contrary” in recognizing action for breach of an implied contract). 
 
Braunfeld v. Forest Home Sys., 12 Va. Cir. 163, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
1988) (holding that the jury properly awarded $3,731.41 in damages to 
the employee for unpaid expenses, outstanding commissions, and the 
employer’s failure to give reasonable notice of termination).  
 
Slade v. Cent. Fid. Bank, N.A., 12 Va. Cir. 291 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988) 
(concluding that “no notice to an employee of twenty-four years is 
prima facie unreasonable” in permitting teller’s claim for bank’s failure 
to provide reasonable notice of at-will termination). 
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ii.  Historical Cases 
Illinois 
 
Gray v. Wulff, 68 Ill. App. 376, 377–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1896) (permitting 
termination of orchestra leader on one week’s notice, concluding that 
employer “had the right to discharge [the plaintiff] on giving him the 
usual and customary notice . . . independent of the question whether he 
was competent” to remain employed). 
 
Maryland 
 
Stubbs v. Vestry of St. John’s Church, 96 Md. 267 (Md. App. 1903) 
(finding that rector’s appointment contract contained no fixed term of 
employment and could therefore be terminated at will upon reasonable 
notice, which had been received). 
 
Bartlett v. Hipkins, 24 A. 532, 532 (1892) (concurrence) (noting that 
while statutory law permitted vestry to terminate its minister, “the right 
must always be exercised with due regard to the principles of justice, 
depending upon the circumstances of the case. Reasonable notice is 
essential.”).  
 
Massachusetts 
 
Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass. 187 (Mass. 1873) (rejecting claim by 
paint maker that he had been hired for a fixed term and concluding that 
the defendants could terminate the employment agreement “at any time 
by reasonable notice”).  
 
New York 
 
Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108, 113 (1854) (accepting the principle 
that customary notice is due to a terminated at-will worker, but finding 
that the plaintiff–newspaper carrier had not established a custom of 
providing one month’s notice). 
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b.  Cases Reciting that At-Will Employment Permits Termination “Upon 
Reasonable Notice” 
i.  Contemporary Cases 
Louisiana 
 
Carlson v. Superior Supply Co., 536 So. 2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 
1988) (asserting in an employment termination case that “[a] contract 
for an indefinite period is terminable at the will of either party upon 
giving reasonable notice”). 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Neal v. Altoona Hosp., 38 Pa. D. & C.3d 599, 601 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
1985) (“An employment contract which has no definite duration is a 
hiring at-will, and may be terminated upon reasonable notice by either 
party at any time.”).  
 
Tennessee 
 
Hutchings v. Jobe, Hastings & Assocs., 2011 WL 3566972, at *1 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2011) (“It has been well-established that Tennessee is an at-
will employment state, meaning that the Employer or the Employee 
may terminate the working relationship at any time without incurring 
any liability provided reasonable notice is given.”).  
 
Texas 
 
Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App. 
1987) (rejecting employee’s claim that he was a permanent employee 
rather than an employee at-will, noting that he was entitled to quit at 
any time upon giving “reasonably short notice”). 
 
Virginia 
 
Cnty. of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. 2001) (“In Virginia, 
an employment relationship is presumed to be at-will, which means that 
the employment term extends for an indefinite period and may be 
terminated by the employer or employee for any reason upon reasonable 
notice.”). 
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ii.  Historical Cases  
California 
 
Mile v. Cal. Growers Wineries, 114 P.2d 651, 679–80 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1941) (noting in action by at-will wine salesman to recover 
commissions that “[personal services] contracts may be terminated by 
either party at will, upon giving the adverse party reasonable notice 
thereof”). 
 
Missouri 
 
Paisley v. Lucas, 143 S.W.2d 262, 271 (Mo. 1940) (“[A]ppellant’s 
contract . . . was a contract for employment as general insurance agent 
and manager for an indefinite term and it could, therefore, be cancelled 
by either party upon reasonable notice to the other.”). 
 
Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 170 S.W.2d 407, 415 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1943) (“[When an employment contract is] executed for an 
indefinite period, and by its nature it is not deemed to be perpetual, it 
may be terminated at will upon reasonable notice.”). 
 
New York 
 
Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1861) (“[An 
employment] contract cannot be unlimited in respect to duration; and 
when no time is fixed for its continuance, it must be considered as 
subject to be terminated by either party on reasonable notice, if the 
interest of either requires a change.”). 
 
Texas 
 
Island Lake Oil Co. v. Hewitt, 244 S.W. 193, 194–95 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1922) (noting that “’when a contract calls for the rendition of services, 
if it is so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration 
cannot be determined by a fair inference from its provisions, either 
party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving reasonable 
notice of his intention to do so’” in holding that indefinite employment 
contract was terminable upon circumstances implying actual notice). 
 
Virginia 
 
Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 55 S.E. 551, 
552 (Va. 1906) (“[W]hen a contract calls for the rendition of services, if 
it is so far incomplete as that the period of its intended duration cannot 
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be determined by a fair inference from its provisions, either party is 
ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving reasonable notice of 
his intention to do so”). 
2.  “NO NOTICE” CASES  
a.  Cases Holding or Presuming that At-Will Employment 
May be Terminated Without Notice 
i.  Contemporary Cases 
Alabama 
 
Allied Supply Co., Inc. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 34–35 (Ala. 1991) 
(holding that managers at an industrial supply company who conspired 
to quit simultaneously without warning were not liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty because “implicit in the ‘employment-at-will’ doctrine is 
the concept that an employee at will can be discharged, or, conversely, 
can terminate his employment, without prior notice”).  
 
Louisiana 
 
Harrison v. CD Consulting, Inc., 2006 WL 1194749 (La. Ct. App. 
2006) (concluding that an at-will employee was not required to provide 
advance notice of departure in rejecting employer’s breach of fiduciary 
duty claim). 
 
Finkle v. Majik Mkt., 628 So. 2d 259, 260, 262 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 
(holding that assistant manager of a retail store who had a “simple, at-
will employment” relationship and “no specific contract” could be 
terminated without notice). 
 
Michigan 
 
Garavaglia v. Centra, Inc., 1998 WL 1991630, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (concluding that “[w]hile defendants were not required to give 
advance notice of their intentions to terminate the parties’ agreement, 
defendants should have notified plaintiff that the contract was 
terminated” in awarding plaintiff retainer fees for period in which he 
was unaware of termination). 
 
Missouri 
 
Boyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246, 247–48 (E.D. Mo. 1903) 
(rejecting a claim by workers terminated without notice and blacklisted 
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for union activity, concluding that “in a free country like ours every 
employ[ee] . . . has the legal right to quit the service of his employer 
without notice, and either with or without cause, . . . [and] any employer 
may legally discharge his employ[ee], with or without notice, at any 
time”). 
 
Virginia 
 
Calquin v. Doodycalls Fairfax, 2009 WL 2947367, at *3 (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 11, 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim against waste removal 
company for immediate termination as “there is no advance notice 
requirement for a termination of an at-will employee”). 
 
Perry v. American Home Products, 1997 WL 109658, at *8–9 (E.D. Va. 
1997) (rejecting chemist’s claim for pharmaceutical company’s failure 
to provide notice of termination concluding that requiring reasonable 
notice would “eviscerate the at-will doctrine”). 
ii.  Historical Cases 
Hawaii 
 
Crawford v. Stewart, 25 Haw. 300, 301 (1920) (rejecting employee’s 
claim for failure to provide notice of termination, concluding that “the 
requirement of such notice would abrogate entirely [the principle] that a 
hiring for a stipulated sum per month without anything further being 
agreed upon to fix the term of hiring constitutes an indefinite hiring and 
is terminable at the will of either party”). 
 
New York 
 
Town & Country House & Home Serv. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 
728 (N.Y. 1958) (noting in rejecting employer’s claim against former 
home cleaning workers that “[i]t would have been courteous of 
[employees] to have given [their employer] advance notice that they 
were going to leave. . . , but their employment was at will, which legally 
required no notice to be given”). 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426, 434 (1864) (sanctioning immediate 
termination of exclusive agency contract between landowner and his 
hired sales agent, holding that the employment was not subject to the 
one-year presumption, but was terminable at the defendant’s pleasure 
and that “no notice was necessary”). 
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b.  Cases Reciting that At-Will Employment Permits 
Termination “Without Notice” 
i.  Contemporary Cases 
Colorado 
 
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987) (en 
banc) (“An employee who is hired in Colorado for an indefinite period 
of time is an ‘at will employee,’ whose employment may be terminated 
by either party without cause and without notice, and whose termination 
does not give rise to a cause of action.”). 
 
Massachusetts 
 
Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 525 N.E.2d 411, 412 
(Mass. 1988) (“Employment at will is terminable by either the 
employee or the employer without notice, for almost any reason or for 
no reason at all.”). 
 
Welgoss v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 2012-1549-C, 2013 WL 4007929, at 
*4 (Mass. Super. 2013) (“The essence of at-will employment is a 
mutual understanding between employer and employee that the 
relationship is of indefinite duration, and that either party may terminate 
it at any time without notice, cause or financial consequence.”). 
 
New York 
 
Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. 2003) (“The traditional 
American common-law rule undergirding employment 
relationships . . . is the presumption that employment for an indefinite or 
unspecified term is at will and may be freely terminated by either party 
at any time without cause or notice.”). 
 
Kotick v. Desai, 507 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“At 
will employment permits either party to terminate the employment 
relation without advance notice . . . .”). 
 
Grozek v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 213, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1978) (“It is well-settled that unless there is a definite period of service 
specified in a contract, the hiring is at will and the employer has the 
right to discharge and the employee to leave at any time, without 
advance notice, and neither has any cause of action against the other.”). 
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Ohio 
 
Bauserman v. Katy Steel & Aluminum Co., 1986 WL 1689, at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1986) (“Appellee, therefore, remained an at-will employee 
even after signing the agreement, and his employment could be 
terminated without notice and for any reason.”). 
 
Oregon 
 
Handam v. Wilsonville Holiday Partners, LLC., 201 P.3d 920, 923 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2009) (“The general rule in Oregon is that employment is ‘at 
will.’ That means that, except as otherwise provided by statute or 
employment agreement, employees may be terminated without notice 
and for any reason.”). 
 
Tennessee 
 
Lee v. City of LaVergne, 2003 WL 1610831, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2003) (“The law is well settled in Tennessee that an at-will employee 
may be terminated for good cause, bad cause or no cause at all, without 
notice.”). 
 
Texas 
 
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (“[Plaintiff] 
was an employee at will and subject to termination without notice or 
cause.”). 
 
Alvarado v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2013 WL 4603394, at *1 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Most of [defendant’s] employees are employed 
on an ’at will’ basis, meaning that either the employee or [the 
defendant] can terminate the employment relationship with or without 
cause and with or without notice.”). 
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ii.  Historical Cases 
Michigan 
 
O’Connor v. Hayes Body Corp., 242 N.W. 233, 234 (Mich. 1932) (“The 
contract of employment, being for no definite period, was a hiring at 
will and could have been terminated, at any time, by either party 
without notice.”).  
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